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(Ad)ministering Justice: A Prosecutor's Ethical Duty
to Support Sentencing Reform
O R. Michael Cassidy*
This Article stakes out an ethical argument in favor of prosecutorial
leadership on sentencing reform. Prosecutors have a duty as "ministers
ofjustice" to go beyond seeking appropriate conviction and punishment
in individual cases, and to think about the delivery of criminal justice on
a systemic level-promoting criminal justice policies that further
broader societal ends. While other authors have explored the tensions
between a prosecutor's adversarial duties and "minister ofjustice" role
in the context of specific litigation, few have explored what it means to
be an "administer" ofjustice in the wider political arena. The author
sets forth a new construct of what is required for a prosecutor to be a
neutral, nonpartisan "administer of justice" in her legislative and
public advocacy activities.
Applying this paradigm to the ongoing national debate about
sentencing reform, the author argues that a prosecutor's administrative
responsibilities as a leader in the criminal justice establishment and her
fiduciary responsibilities as a representative of the sovereign should
compel her to join in the effort to repeal mandatory minimum
sentencing provisions for most drug and non-violent offenses. Not only
are mandatory sentences in most instances inefficacious and unduly
coercive, but they allow for an arbitrary and discriminatory application
that is essentially unreviewable by courts. The author distinguishes his
argument against mandatory minimum penalties from the so-called
"Smart on Crime" movement, by grounding a prosecutor's duty to
promote sentencing reform in ethical reasoning as opposed to
pragmatic or cost-savings considerations.
* Professor and Dean's Research Scholar, Boston College Law School. My views on the
issues discussed herein are colored by my experience for approximately nine years as a state
prosecutor in Massachusetts, including service as Chief of the Criminal Bureau in the Office of
the Attorney General. I am grateful to the Boston College Law School Fund for supporting my
research, and to Nathan B. Roberts, Boston College Law School Class of 2015, for his thoughtful
and capable research assistance. I am also indebted to Pamela Hunt, Judy McMorrow, Daniel
Medwed, Steven Morrison, Paul McManus and Janet Moore for their very helpful comments on
an earlier draft. All errors are my own.
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A second important question the author addresses in this Article is
how an ethical prosecutor should make plea bargaining decisions in the
face of mandatory minimum prison terms that are retained by the
legislature. Even with political support from some of this nation's most
conscientious prosecutors, state legislatures are unlikely to repeal or
cut back on all mandatory minimum sentences. Some mandatory prison
terms-for crimes such as murder, repeat offense OUI and aggravated
sexual assault-will likely stay on the books notwithstanding current
calls for reform and the robust advocacy recommended above. In the
second half of this Article, the author addresses the prosecutor's ethical
conduct in charging and plea bargaining crimes that carry mandatory
prison terms. While there has been substantial legal scholarship to date
that has decried the manner in which mandatory minimum penalties
have transferred sentencing discretion from judges to prosecutors,
beyond that descriptive lament there has been very little attention paid
to how exactly prosecutorial discretion might be more meaningfully
channeled and constrained. The author argues that prosecutors could
mitigate many of the harsh and unjust consequences of mandatory
minimum sentences through internal self-regulation; that is, by
instituting and publishing clear office policies governing when line
prosecutors may dismiss or reduce charges that carry them. He
proposes specific guidelines that state prosecutors should adopt to
ensure a consistent and even-handed application of mandatory
minimum penalties, so that line prosecutors do not abuse the substantial
discretion that has been afforded them in the plea bargaining process.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1995, former District Attorney Robert Morgenthau of Manhattan
wrote a now-famous editorial in the New York Times opposing a death
penalty bill then pending before the New York State legislature. With
courage and candor, Morgenthau said this about the death penalty:
It exacts a terrible price in dollars, lives and human decency. Rather
than tamping down the flames of violence, it fuels them while
draining millions of dollars from more promising efforts to restore
safety to our lives.... That's why many district attorneys throughout
New York State and America oppose it-privately. Fear of political
repercussions keeps them from saying so publicly.'
Notwithstanding Morgenthau's plaint, the New York legislature
passed, and the Governor signed, an act authorizing the imposition of
the death penalty.2 The act remained in effect for the next nine years
until the New York Court of Appeals suspended its implementation
citing state constitutional infirmities. 3
Today, prosecutors across this country face a moral, ethical and
political dilemma with respect to mandatory minimum sentences similar
to the one they first faced with respect to the death penalty in the latter
part of the twentieth century. Should they admit that mandatory
minimum sentences have been a failure and advocate for their repeal in
favor of more penalogically sound sentencing strategies? Or, should
they continue their "tough on crime" stance on punishment, because it is
both politically expedient and provides them with strategic leverage for
plea bargaining in a horribly overburdened criminal justice system?
In this Article, I stake out an ethical argument in favor of
prosecutorial leadership on sentencing reform. Prosecutors have a duty
as "ministers of justice" to go beyond seeking convictions and
legislatively authorized sentences in individual cases, and to think about
the delivery of criminal justice on a systemic level, promoting criminal
justice policies that further broader societal ends. Specifically, I argue
that a prosecutor's administrative responsibilities as a leader in the
criminal justice establishment, and her fiduciary responsibilities as a
representative of the sovereign, should compel her to join the effort to
repeal mandatory minimum sentencing provisions for most drug and
nonviolent offenses. Not only are mandatory sentences in most
instances unduly coercive and counterproductive, but they also allow
1. Robert Morganthau, Op-Ed., What Prosecutors Won't Tell You, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1995,
at A25.
2. Act of Mar. 7, 1995, ch. 1, 1995 N.Y. Laws 1.
3. People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 366-67 (N.Y. 2004).
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for an arbitrary and discriminatory application that is essentially
unreviewable by courts.
I recognize that even with the political support of this nation's
prosecutors, state legislatures are unlikely to repeal or cut back on all
mandatory minimum sentences. Some mandatory prison terms-for
crimes such as murder and repeat violent offenses-will likely stay on
the books notwithstanding even the most robust law reform efforts by
conscientious prosecutors. Thus, a second question I grapple with in
this Article is how an ethical prosecutor should make discretionary
charge reduction decisions in the face of mandatory minimum prison
terms duly enacted and retained by the legislature. While there has been
substantial legal scholarship to date that has decried the manner in
which mandatory minimum penalties have transferred sentencing
discretion from judges to prosecutors, beyond that descriptive lament
there has been very little attention paid to how exactly prosecutorial
discretion might be more meaningfully constrained through internal
self-regulation and transparency. In this Article I argue that prosecutors
can mitigate many of the harsh and unjust consequences of mandatory
minimum sentences by instituting and publishing office policies
governing when line prosecutors may dismiss or reduce charges that
carry them. I also propose and draft specific guidelines that state
prosecutors should follow to ensure a consistent and even-handed
application of mandatory minimum penalties so that line prosecutors do
not abuse the substantial discretion that has been afforded them by the
plea bargaining process.
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I examine the so-called
"prison problem" in America, and explain how the rise of mandatory
sentencing in the 1980s and 1990s has contributed to our country's
alarming and unparalleled incarceration rate. In Part II, I examine the
ethical responsibilities of prosecutors under the American Bar
Association ("ABA") Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the
nonbinding ABA Criminal Justice Standards. I shape the contours of a
duty that prosecutors owe to their constituents not only to seek just
results in individual cases, but also to help shape a criminal justice
system that is collectively just and consonant with the public interest:
that is, effective at protecting public safety, transparent, consistent and
fair. I explain how most mandatory minimum sentences, in practice, are
antithetical to each of these overarching systemic goals. I also describe
isolated but important instances in recent years where prosecutors in
certain states have joined in the fight to repeal or limit mandatory
sentencing schemes, and I examine the political, demographic and
social conditions that have made such leadership possible. In Part III, I
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propose a form of internal self-regulation for prosecutors interested in
promoting consistency and avoiding arbitrary and discriminatory
application of mandatory sentences-urging them to set up a committee
in their jurisdictions to review and approve (against established criteria)
any dismissals of charges involving mandatory sentences. I also
propose a role for judges to play in promoting such prosecutorial self-
regulation by insisting on a written statement of reasons for dismissal of
charges carrying a mandatory minimum penalty during the plea
bargaining process.
My focus for reform will be on state prosecutors and state sentencing
systems. While attention to federal sentencing practices seems to be a
deeply ingrained habit of criminal law scholars, the federal system
accounts for only 6% of felony convictions in the United States each
year.4 With regards to criminal justice--or injustice-in America, the
rubber meets the road in state courts, because that is where the vast
majority of property, vice and violent crimes are prosecuted. Moreover,
federal prosecutors are already regulated in part by the plea bargaining
guidelines of the United States Attorneys' Manual, by the adoption of
substantial cooperation procedures (so-called "5ki.1 Committees") in
district offices and by the federal safety valve, which allows a United
States District Court judge to deviate from mandatory sentences in
limited circumstances for a small number of low-level drug crimes.5 I
will draw on some of these constraints on federal prosecutorial
discretion in Part III of the Article, where I describe the wisdom and
contours of proposed state-level reforms.
I. MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES AND THE PROBLEM OF MASS
INCARCERATION
The United States imprisons more people than any other country,
including China (a nation with four times our population). 6 At the end
of 2012, the United States was incarcerating a total of 2.2 million
people in local, state and federal jails and prisons.7  To put this
4. Marc L. Miller, A Map of Sentencing and a Compass for Judges: Sentencing Information
Systems, Transparency, and the Next Generation of Reform, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1351, 1353
(2005).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2012). For a proposal to broaden the federal safety valve, see S. 619,
113th Cong. (2013).
6. United States v. Bannister, 786 F. Supp. 2d 617, 650 (E.D.N.Y 2011) (citing JAMES AUSTIN
ET AL., JFA INST., UNLOCKING AMERICA: WHY AND How TO REDUCE AMERICA'S PRISON
POPULATION 3 (2007)).
7. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, as of 2012 there were over 1.5 million people
incarcerated in our nation's state and federal prisons. Prisoners in 2012 - Advance Counts,
BUREAU JUST. STAT. (July 25, 2013), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty-pbdetail&iid=4737. An
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"incarceration explosion" 8 in even more dramatic relief, the United
States comprises 5% of the world's population, but houses 25% of its
prisoners.9
Our three-decade-long incarceration spirallo has coincided with the
disturbing proliferation of mandatory minimum penalties enacted by
Congress and state legislatures. Every state and the federal government
now has at least one criminal offense on the books carrying a mandatory
minimum penalty,11 and most have many more. In the federal system,
there are now over 170 federal crimes that carry mandatory sentences,
an increase of 78% since 1991.12 At the state level, common crimes
carrying mandatory sentences include: drug trafficking (distribution of
or possession with intent to distribute narcotics above a certain
weight); 13 distribution of narcotics within a school zone; 14 assault on an
elderly, blind or disabled person;' 5 possession or use of a firearm during
the commission of a felony;1 6 repeat offender operating under the
influence ("OUI");17 committing designated crimes while masked;18
commission of a felony at the direction of or in affiliation with a gang;19
carjacking; 20 certain hate crimes; 21 vehicular manslaughter; 22 rape; 23
additional approximately 740,000 were housed in local jails and houses of correction. Jail
Inmates at Midyear 2012 - Statistical Tables, BUREAU JUST. STAT. (May 22, 2013),
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfi?ty-pbdetail&iid=4655.
8. Bannister, 786 F. Supp. 2d at 649 (internal quotations omitted).
9. John F. Pfaff, Waylaid by a Metaphor: A Deeply Problematic Account of Prison Growth,
111 MICH. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (2013); Richard A. Viguerie, Op-Ed., A Conservative Case for
Prison Reform, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2013, at A23.
10. Since 1980, the size of the American prison population has more than quadrupled.
Viguerie, supra note 9. Over this same period, the federal prison population has increased by an
even more alarming 790%. NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE FEDERAL PRISON
POPULATION BULDUP: OVERVIEW, POLICY CHANGES, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS 51 (2013).
11. Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA. L. REV. 715, 748 (2005); David
Bjerk, Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role ofProsecutorial Discretion, 48 J.L. & ECON.
591, 591 (2005).
12. William K. Sessions Ill, At the Crossroads of the Three Branches: The U.S. Sentencing
Commission's Attempts to Achieve Sentencing Reform in the Midst of Inter-Branch Power
Struggles, 26 J.L. & POL. 305, 331 (2011).
13. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 893.135 (2013); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7508 (2013).
14. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32J (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-432
(2013).
15. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-60c (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-660.2 (2013).
16. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 775.087; INN. STAT. § 609.11(5)(b) (2013).
17. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 321J.2 (2013); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 29-A, § 2411 (2013).
18. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 17; OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1303 (2013).
19. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22 (West 2013); MINN. STAT. § 609.229.
20. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-136a; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-58.1 (2013).
21. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.10(4) (McKinney 2010).
22. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13 2; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-5 (West 2013).
23. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1115; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61.
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certain sexual offenses involving minors;24 so-called "three strikes and
you're out" punishments for habitual offenders; 25 and murder.26 This
list certainly is not exhaustive.
Legislatures began to enact mandatory minimum penalties more
routinely in the early 1980s, in order to counteract widely disparate
sentences handed out by judges and to promote uniformity in
sentencing.27  Some scholars thought that mandatory minimum
sentences would increase the general deterrent effect of criminal laws
by sending a strong message to would-be offenders about the likelihood
of imprisonment upon apprehension. 28 Other commentators thought
that these sentences would promote public safety by specifically
incapacitating some of our nation's most dangerous criminals.29
Uniformity, deterrence and incapacitation were thus the most frequently
expressed grounds for taking sentencing discretion away from judges in
this fashion.30 But a hidden contributing factor was what Philip Pettit
terms the "outrage dynamic": dramatic and highly sensationalized
media accounts of some criminals receiving lenient sentences were
often followed by renewed "tough on crime" measures by lawmakers. 31
While it has become popular to blame our current mass incarceration
crisis on the "war on drugs" that commenced with the Reagan
administration in the 1980s, 32 draconian narcotics penalties are not the
only source of the problem. The length of prison sentences is an often-
overlooked piece of the incarceration puzzle, 33 and increased sentence
24. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-70c; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2520G (2013).
25. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 2013); FLA. STAT. § 775.084 (2013).
26. See e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 2; OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115 (2013).
27. See Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States Sentencing
Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and Effective
Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 185, 193 (1993).
28. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 176-77 (1968); Phil Granmm, Drugs, Crime and Punishment; Don't Let Judges Set Crooks
Free, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1993, at A19.
29. See, e.g., Robert S. Mueller, III, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 4 FED. SENT'G REP.
230, 230(1992).
30. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 85-88 (2011), available at http://www.
ussc.gov/Legislative-andPublicAffairs/CongressionalTestimonyand Reports/MandatoryMi
nimum Penalties/20111031_RtCPDF/Chapter_05.pdf.
31. See Philip Pettit, Is Criminal Justice Politically Feasible?, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 427,
437 (2002).
32. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 5 (rev. ed. 2012); ERNEST DRUCKER, A
PLAGUE OF PRISONS 50-51 (2011).
33. See Kevin R. Reitz, Don't Blame Determinacy: US. Incarceration Growth has been
Driven by other Forces, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1799 (2006).
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length is a direct product of mandatory minimum sentencing schemes. 34
Simply put, more people are being sentenced to prison in the United
States as a result of mandatory minimum penalties, and those who are
sentenced to prison are staying there longer.35 The drug war was not
the sole driver of mass incarceration 36 because mandatory sentences for
weapons offenses, vehicular offenses and certain forms of aggravated
assault have also contributed to prison growth. But there is also a subtle
way in which the war on drugs has magnified our incarceration
problem, by allowing more defendants to be treated as habitual
offenders as a result of prior drug convictions as opposed to
diversions. 37 Mandatory sentences for narcotics and weapons offenses
have thus worked in tandem with habitual offender laws to fuel our
nation's incarceration spiral.
Although mandatory sentences have caused our nation's prison
population to explode, they have not achieved the desired goal of
sentencing uniformity. These laws have simply shifted sentencing
authority to prosecutors, 38 who enjoy unfettered discretion to dismiss or
reduce a charge carrying a mandatory sentence in exchange for a guilty
plea.39  Overlapping criminal codes magnify this enlargement of
executive authority because they permit prosecutors to select charges
from a broad menu of criminal offenses that may fit the defendant's
behavior.40 A study by the United States Sentencing Commission found
that in about 25% of the cases in the federal system where the arrested
34. United States v. Bannister, 786 F. Supp. 2d 617, 650 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
35. According to a report by MassiNC, the average length of stay of incarceration in the
United States since 1990 has increased by one-third. BENJAMIN FORMAN & JOHN LARIVEE,
MASSINC, CRIME, COST, AND CONSEQUENCES: IS IT TIME TO GET SMART ON CRIME? 12 (2013).
36. John Pfaff has studied state prison growth between 1980 and 2009, and has concluded that
incarcerations for narcotics offenses account for only 21% of prison growth during that period,
while violent offenders account for 51% of that growth and property offenders 16%. Pfaff, supra
note 9, at 1093. While the percentage change in incarceration rates for state narcotics offenders
dwarfs that for violent and property offenders (the percentage of state prisoners serving time for
narcotics offenses has grown by over 1000% between 1980 and 2009), that is because the base
rate of incarceration for narcotics offenses was so low in 1980 compared to the other two classes
of offense. Id.
37. Id at 1096-97.
38. Bjerk,supra note 11, at 592.
39. MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 147 (1996) ("Prosecutors often avoid
application of mandatory sentencing laws simply by filing charges for a different, but roughly
comparable offense that is not subject to mandatory sentences."); see Kyle Graham,
Overcharging, SANTA CLARA L. DIGITAL COMMONS 4 (Mar. 1, 2013), http://digitalcommons.
law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1609&context=facpubs (discussing the "charge-
bargaining" and "overcharging" practices that prosecutors engage in to secure guilty pleas).
40. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
509 (2001) (describing how the broad range and overlapping nature of activities criminalized by
the legislature shifts power to prosecutors).
988 [Vol. 45
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offense was covered by a mandatory minimum penalty, the defendant
was ultimately tried or sentenced under an alternative statute.4 1
Moreover, as I will discuss in Part III, prosecutors tend to circumvent
these mandatory minimum laws based on their own preferences or
constraints, rather than any transparent assessment of the strengths or
weaknesses of the case. 42  Prosecutorial choices-not legislative
preferences-are thus driving sentencing outcomes. 43  Because
prosecutors can readily bargain around mandatory minimums without
stating their reasons and subjecting these reasons to review, mandatory
sentencing laws are fostering disparity rather than promoting
uniformity.
There is also strong evidence that the second rationale for mandatory
sentencing-deterrence-has proven to be a massive failure. At both
the federal and the state level, mandatory minimum penalties for drug
crimes have proliferated.44 But after thirty years of enforcing harsh
drug laws, the demand for narcotics in the United States has remained
relatively stable, causing many commentators to liken this failed thirty-
year experiment to Prohibition.45  The overwhelming empirical
41. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY
MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 56-58 (1991), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/LegislativeandPublicAffairs/Congressional Testimony and Reports/Ma
ndatoryMinimumPenalties/199108_RtCMandatoryMinimum.htm.
42. See Bjerk, supra note 11, at 606-08. As I will argue in Part III, infra, the considerations
that are invisibly guiding a prosecutor's discretion with respect to charge reductions are not
presently subject to any real political check. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The
Worldwide Accountability Deficit for Prosecutors, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1587, 1597-99
(2010) [hereinafter Accountability Deficit for Prosecutors].
43. Professors Stuntz and Barkow have argued convincingly that legislatures implicitly
tolerate this manipulation of mandatory minimum penalties because the prosecutor's power to
coerce guilty pleas reduces the overall cost of convicting criminal defendants. See Barkow, supra
note 11, at 728; Stuntz, supra note 40, at 520.
44. Christopher Mascharka, Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Exemplifying the Law of
Unintended Consequences, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 935, 936 (2001). Close to 50% of federal
inmates are now serving time for drug offenses. NANCY LA VIGNE & JULIE SAMUELS, URBAN
INST., THE GROWTH & INCREASING COST OF THE FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM: DRIVERS AND
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 5 (2012), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412693-The-
Growth-and-Increasing-Cost-of-the-Federal-Prison-System.pdf. Many of these inmates are
serving mandatory minimum sentences. See Mark W. Bennett, How Mandatory Minimums
Forced Me to Send More Than 1000 Nonviolent Drug Offenders to Federal Prison, NATION (Oct.
24, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/170815/how-mandatory-minimums-forced-me-send-
more-1000-nonviolent-drug-offenders-federal-pri#.
45. See, e.g., Hon. Juan R. Torruella, Dji Vu: A Federal Judge Revisits the War on Drugs, or
Life in a Balloon, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 167, 199 (2011); Grover Norquist, What Conservatives
Are Saying, RIGHT ON CRIME, http://www.rightoncrime.com/the-conservative-case-for-
reform/what-conservatives-are-saying (last visited Aug. 21, 2013) ("Illegal drug use rates are
relatively stable, not shrinking. It appears that mandatory minimums have become a sort of poor
man's Prohibition: a grossly simplistic and ineffectual government response to a problem that has
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evidence suggests that increases in sentence length for drug crimes in
this country have not had a significant effect on deterrence. 46 As will
be discussed in Part III, if there is any deterrent value whatsoever to
mandatory sentencing that outweighs its high costs and negative effects,
it is likely to be limited to the specific deterrent effect of incapacitating
a very narrow class of violent offenders.
We may have reached a tipping point. Some signs now suggest that
our nation's overemphasis on incarceration-particularly its preference
for mandatory minimum sentencing schemes-is starting to erode.47
More than a dozen jurisdictions have begun to roll-back certain
mandatory minimum sentences, particularly for drug crimes, through a
variety of mechanisms, 48 such as: increasing the quantity of drugs
which is necessary to kick in the mandatory penalty,49 decreasing the
distance necessary to establish the required proximity element of a
school zone offense 50 and providing judges with discretion to deviate
from statutory mandatories and divert offenders to probation for certain
first time narcotics offenses. 51 In those states that have modified their
mandatory sentences, however, incremental reform rather than outright
repeal has been the dominant theme.52 These modest reforms have been
motivated by a number of interdependent factors such as the high cost
of incarceration,53 a recognition that diversion and treatment may be
been around longer than our government itself.").
46. See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 28-
29 (2006) ("Imaginable increases in severity of punishment do not yield significant (if any)
marginal deterrent effects. Three National Academy of Science panels ... reached that
conclusion, as has every major survey of the evidence." (citation omitted)).
47. See Erica Goode, U.S. Prison Populations Decline, Reflecting New Approach to Crime,
N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2013, at All (explaining that many states are decreasing their prison
populations by altering sentencing for lower-level drug-related offenses and creating alternatives
to prison for these crimes); Nicholas D. Kristof, Help Thy Neighbor and Go Straight to Prison,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2013, at SRI (same).
48. See Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Recent State-Level Reforms to Mandatory
Minimum Laws, FAMM (Feb. 25, 2013), http://famm.org/Repository/Files/FS%20List/*200f/
20State%20Reforms%202.25.13.pdf.
49. See, e.g., Act of Aug, 2, 2012, ch. 192, 2012 Mass. Legis. Serv. (West); Act of July 14,
2012, S.B. 628, §§ 195.222-23, 2012 Mo. Legis. Serv. (West); see also Fair Sentencing Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, §§ 2-3, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (eliminating the mandatory minimum
penalty for possession of crack cocaine and reducing crack cocaine disparity under sentencing
guidelines from 100:1 to 18:1).
50. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 20, 2011, ch. 13, 2011 Del. Legis. Serv. (West); Act of Aug, 2, 2012,
ch. 192, 2012 Mass. Legis. Serv. (West).
51. See, e.g., Act of June 29, 2011, file 29, 2011 Ohio Legis. Serv. Ann. (West); Act of June
2, 2010, No. 273, § 37, 2010 S.C. Acts.
52. See Marc Mauer, State Sentencing Reforms: Is the "Get Tough" Era Coming to a Close?,
15 FED. SENT'G. REP. 50, 52 (2002).
53. Id. at 51; see ALEXANDER, supra note 32, at 14 ("Many of the states that have
990 [Vol. 45
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more effective approaches than incarceration for low-level drug
offenseS54 and the loss of political saliency for "get tough on crime"
rhetoric during an era of declining crime rates.55  While these
incremental reforms to our nation's narcotics laws have begun-just
slightly-to reduce the size of our nation's prison population, these
reductions have been exceptionally modest compared to the overall
scale of our mass incarceration problem. 56 More importantly, the chief
prosecutors who have supported such limited reform have done so not
because the laws amended were fundamentally unfair or inequitable, but
because they believed that alternative punishment schemes for certain
crimes would be less costly and more efficient.57 So far, what has been
missing from the discourse about mandatory minimum sentencing is a
discussion of the ethical responsibilities of prosecutors who perceive
themselves as operating within a flawed system.
In Part II, I intend to set forth an ethical (as opposed to an economic,
political or pragmatic) argument in favor of prosecutorial leadership in
sentencing reform. My primary audience in Part II includes chief
prosecutors, criminal justice scholars and law reform advocates in those
thirty or so states that have not yet undertaken any meaningful repeal of
mandatory minimum sentences. In Part III, I will address a more
reconsidered their harsh sentencing schemes have done so not out of concern for the lives and
families that have been destroyed by these laws or the racial dimensions of the drug war, but out
of concern for bursting state budgets in a time of economic recession. In other words, the racial
ideology that gave rise to these laws remains largely undisturbed.").
54. Mauer, supra note 52, at 51.
55. Id. In 2012, the U.S. crime rates for serious violent crime-murder, rape, robbery and
assault-fell to their lowest point since 1963. Daniel B. Wood, US Crime Rate at Lowest Point in
Decades. Why America is Safer Now., CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR (Jan. 9, 2012)
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2012/0109/US-crime-rate-at-lowest-point-in-decades.-
Why-America-is-safer-now.
56. Goode, supra note 47 (reporting that the number inmates in state and federal prisons
dropped for a third straight year from a peak of 1.61 million in 2009 to 1.57 million in 2012).
57. Such pragmatic arguments in favor of incremental criminal justice reform have been
cleverly labeled the "'smart on crime' movement." See Roger Fairfax, The "Smart on Crime"
Prosecutor, 25 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 905, 906 (2012). Several prominent chief prosecutors
have jumped on the "smart on crime" bandwagon. Attorney General Eric Holder, at a 2009
meeting of the American Bar Association, argued that "[g]etting smart on crime requires talking
openly about which policies have worked and which have not. And we have to do so without
worrying about being labeled as too soft or too hard on crime. Getting smart on crime means
moving beyond useless labels and catch-phrases, and instead relying on science and data to shape
policy." Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., Remarks at the 2009 ABA Convention (Aug. 3, 2009),
available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-090803.html. California
Attorney General Kamala Harris, during her tenure as San Francisco District Attorney, authored a
book urging law enforcement officials to "reject[] our old, unsuccessful approaches and rhetoric,
having realized that if we truly want to be tough, we must be much smarter in our modern war on
crime." KAMALA HARRIS, SMART ON CRIME: A CAREER PROSECUTOR'S PLAN TO MAKE US
SAFER 199 (2009).
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national audience, and attempt to set the framework for an internal
regulatory structure that will enable prosecutors in all states to fulfill
their ethical obligations as "ministers of justice" by changing the
manner in which they exercise discretion when enforcing those criminal
statutes that are likely to continue to carry mandatory sentences, even
after the current wave of state reform movements has tempered or
concluded.
II. THE PROSECUTOR'S ETHICAL DUTY TO SUPPORT SENTENCING REFORM
For almost a century, courts, scholars and bar disciplinary authorities
have promoted the image of our nation's prosecutors as quasi-judicial
officers whose role in criminal adjudication differs from that of an
ordinary advocate. 58 Comment [1] to the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 notes that "[a] prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an
advocate." 59  Its predecessor, the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility EC 7-13, similarly provided that "[tjhe responsibility of a
public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to
seek justice, not merely to convict."60 Both formulations hail from a
1935 Supreme Court opinion, wherein Justice Sutherland stated that:
[The prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done.61
The most commonly cited and convincing ground for imposing a
special obligation on prosecutors to serve as "ministers of justice" is
their special role as a fiduciary representing the sovereign. 62 Because
the prosecutor represents society at large, she has no personal client to
direct her course of action and must make decisions about what is in the
best interests of the sovereign that ordinarily would be entrusted to a
client. This unique role of both principal and agent requires the
prosecutor to pursue the public interest, rather than simply pursue a
conviction. Former Model Code provision EC 7-13 accurately captured
58. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to the
Unconvertedfrom the Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REv. 35, 39 (2009).
59. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt.[1] (2013) (emphasis added).
60. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 EC 7-13 (1982) (emphasis added).
61. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (emphasis added) (reversing conspiracy
conviction due to prosecutor's improper cross examination and closing argument).
62. See R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROsECUTORIAL ETHICS 2 (2d ed. 2013); Bruce A. Green,
Why Should Prosecutors Seek Justice?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 634 (1999).
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this unique fiduciary obligation by requiring that all decisions of a
prosecutor "affecting the public interest should be fair to all." 63 Yet
except for a narrow range of very specific limitations on a prosecutor's
discretion-such as the duty to refrain from prosecuting a case without
probable cause, the duty to disclose exculpatory information to the
defense and the duty to refrain from urging an unrepresented accused to
waive important pre-trial rightS64-attorney discipline rules offer very
little guidance on what exactly it means to "seek justice" if you are a
public prosecutor.65 The prosecutor's duty has been described by one
leading authority as "maddeningly vague and frustratingly
amorphous." 66
In analyzing the contours of a prosecutor's unique ethical
responsibilities, scholars typically focus on litigation and allude to the
prosecutor's "dual role" as both an advocate and quasi-judicial officer. 67
Certainly the sovereign is a client who is deserving of competent, strong
and persuasive advocacy in pursuit of the conviction and punishment of
guilty persons. When a prosecutor is performing an adversarial function
in court (e.g., arguing for conditions of bail, opposing a motion to
suppress evidence, presenting evidence at trial) the prosecutor's role as
advocate therefore requires her to represent the state's case in the light
most favorable to the government. The critical ethical inquiry in that
context, however, is whether and how such zeal should be tempered by
the prosecutor's additional obligation as a "minister of justice," and
what exactly that phrase might mean. Several scholars, including
myself, have attempted to stake out some contours to this "justice"
obligation in the context of litigation. The late Fred Zacharias argued
that it requires attention to adversarial fairness to help ensure that the
results of criminal proceedings are both as accurate as possible and
worthy of respect. 68 Dan Medwed has argued that the obligation to seek
justice requires a fundamental commitment to protecting the innocent
from wrongful conviction and punishment.69 Alafair Burke has argued
63. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 EC 7-13 (1982).
64. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rs. 3.8(a), 3.8(c), 3.8(d) (2012).
65. Green, supra note 62, at 615-16.
66. Bennett L. Gershman, The Zealous Prosecutor as Minister of Justice, 48 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 151, 155 (2011).
67. See Alafair Burke, Prosecution (is) Complex, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 697, 706 (2013);
Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44
VAND. L. REv. 45, 72 (1991).
68. Zacharias, supra note 67, at 61-62; see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8
cmt.[1] (2013) ("[R]esponsibility [of the prosecutor] carries with it specific obligations to see that
the defendant is accorded procedural justice . . . .").
69. Medwed, supra note 58, at 48 (2009); see also Green, supra note 62, at 622 (stating that
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that serving as a "minister of justice" requires neutrality in decision-
making, particularly with respect to important pretrial decisions such as
investigation, charging and plea bargaining. 70 Without rejecting any of
these extremely helpful formulations, I have argued elsewhere that a
prosecutor's unique professional responsibility in litigation also requires
a fidelity to empathy and honesty.71
Outside the adversarial context, however, it is simply not accurate to
say that a prosecutor is performing a "dual role," because she is not
serving as an advocate for a party in litigation before a neutral fact
finder. Perhaps that is why ABA Criminal Justice Standards § 3-1.2(b)
uses slightly different language than ABA Model Rule 3.8 to describe a
prosecutor's special responsibilities. This section describes a prosecutor
as "an administrator of justice, an advocate, and an officer of the court"
and explains that the prosecutor must "exercise sound discretion" in
performing each of these distinct yet overlapping roles.72 The use of the
term "administrator," as opposed to "minister," is meaningful and
highlights the difference between pursuing justice in individual cases as
a litigator, and pursuing the public interest by promoting a just system
as a government official. This construction is consistent with the
Supreme Court's suggestion in Berger that because a prosecutor is both
a representative and a fiduciary, she has a prominent role to play in
governing as well as in litigating.73
When the prosecutor is serving in a governing capacity rather than a
litigation capacity (as she often does when giving speeches, drafting
legislation, working with the police and community leaders to develop
crime-prevention programs and serving on boards or commissions) the
prosecutor is not performing an adversarial role in representing the
sovereign, and therefore does not have any duty of zealous advocacy
that must be balanced against other competing public demands. While
performing these functions, a prosecutor committed to justice must
detach herself from the partisan role that we normally ascribe to
advocates under the standard conception of professional
the goal to "seek justice" implies pursuing substantive fairness to assure that innocent are not
convicted).
70. Burke, supra note 67, at 705; cf Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial
Neutrality, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 837, 897.
71. R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a
Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to Seek Justice, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 635, 653, 667 (2006).
72. AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEF. FUNCTION §
3-1.2(b) (3d ed. 1993) (emphasis added).
73. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("It is as much [the prosecutor's] duty
to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to bring
about a just one.").
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responsibility. 74 This theme of detachment and non-partisanship is
emphasized in the commentary to ABA Criminal Justice Standards §3-
1.2, which elaborates on the prosecutor's role as an "administrator" of
justice as follows: "Such professional integrity and detachment is
furthered by the prosecutor's efforts, independent of the prosecutorial
role, to engage in appropriate law reform activities and to remedy
injustices that the prosecutor sees in the administration of criminal
justice generally in his or her jurisdiction." 75  A prosecutor who is
engaged in governing should thus abandon her partisan role, and pursue
the public interest broadly conceived without regard to whether it will
provide the government with strategic advantages in litigation.
All too frequently, prosecutors in the United States embrace their
responsibility as ministers of justice, while ignoring their responsibility
as administrators of justice. In her role as an advocate (minister), a
prosecutor must temper zeal with a fidelity to truth and a commitment
to fair play. In her role as a leader/governor (administrator), a
prosecutor must be guided by the public interest in promoting a fair,
reliable and efficient criminal justice system worthy of confidence and
respect. Prosecutors cannot shrink from this second responsibility by
seeking justice in individual cases, while simply hoping or expecting
that overall systemic justice will result. Being an administrator means
that a prosecutor must have the courage to speak up about what works
and what does not work in our criminal justice system, and to advocate
for law reform whenever systemic inequities come to her attention.76
That is why ABA Criminal Justice Standards § 3-1.2(d) advises that
"[i]t is an important function of the prosecutor to seek to reform and
improve the administration of criminal justice." 77 Representing a
sovereign requires special attention to the public interest broadly
conceived, not just to procedural fairness and accuracy in the litigation
of individual cases.
74. TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF ROGUES? A DEFENCE OF THE STANDARD CONCEPTION OF
THE LAWYER'S ROLE 5-11 (2009) (describing the three elemental maxims of the standard
conception of legal ethics as: neutrality, under which a lawyer should refrain from reaching
independent moral judgments about the merits of a client's objective; partisanship, under which
lawyers should vigorously pursue their client's objectives; and nonaccountability, under which a
lawyer may not be held morally responsible for the objectives she pursues on behalf of a client.).
75. AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEF. FUNCTION §
3-1.2(d) cmt.6 (3d ed. 1993) (emphasis added).
76. See Bruce A. Green, Gideon's Amici: Why Do Prosecutors So Rarely Defend the Rights of
the Accused?, 122 YALE L.J. 2336, 2343 (2013) ("While government lawyers undoubtedly see
their litigating role as paramount, they also have a responsibility to promote the sound
development of the law. . . .").
77. AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEF. FUNCTION §
3-1.2(d) (3d. ed. 1993) (emphasis added).
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This expectation of nonpartisanship in a prosecutor's administrative
functions should extend beyond sentencing reform. Prosecutors
perform a variety of administrative functions in their roles as leaders in
the criminal justice community. When a prosecutor is serving on a
judicial committee to study revision of the rules of criminal procedure,
or is advising the executive on the composition, duties or procedures of
the parole board, or is testifying before the legislature on the operational
standards and audit procedures of state forensic laboratories, the
prosecutor's primary function as an "(ad)minister of justice" should be
to ensure the fairness and accountability of the criminal justice
system-not swift and certain convictions. In those contexts, the
prosecutor's duty of loyalty toward their client (the state) requires the
prosecutor to abandon a partisan adversarial role in a fashion that
simply would not be expected of a private defense attorney called upon
to render similar advice on law reform initiatives.
What are some of the critical components of a fair and effective
criminal justice system? As an "(ad)minister" of justice, a prosecutor
should, at a minimum,78 be concerned about promoting consistency in
the application of the criminal laws, fairness in plea bargaining,
protection of public safety through a reduction of recidivism and an
efficient expenditure of limited criminal justice resources. As I will
argue below, each of these four components of "systemic" justice is
compromised by mandatory sentencing schemes. Prosecutors should
thus feel ethically compelled to lend their considerable expertise and
78. A fifth argument in favor of repealing mandatory sentences is that they impose unduly
harsh and disproportionate punishments; that is, they sacrifice individualized justice (calibrated
punishment based on an actor's individual moral desert) in favor of deterrence and uniformity. In
my view, such considerations are uniquely within the province of the legislature. The
traditionally recognized goals of criminal punishment-deterrence, incapacitation, retribution and
rehabilitation-involve constantly shifting and sometimes competing considerations. See Nancy
Gertner, A Short History ofAmerican Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much Law, or Just Right?,
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 691 (2010). It is difficult to construct an ethical (as
opposed to a political, economic or pragmatic) argument that a prosecutor must oppose
mandatory sentences across the board, where the legislative branch, as the primary actor in our
system of govemment responsible for defining crimes and setting penalties, has consciously
decided to value uniformity and deterrence over proportionality for particular offenses. In other
words, the fact that a mandatory sentence may be harsh in individual circumstances might prompt
a prosecutor as a minister of justice to avoid or reduce a particular charge in the context of
specific litigation (as I argue in Part IV below). But it is hard to argue that as an (ad)minister of
justice, a prosecutor is ethically required to oppose the legislature's decision to enact mandatory
penalties for that crime in all instances on the ground of proportionality, without disturbing our
traditional respect for the primacy of the legislature. Other grounds for opposing mandatory
sentences that I discuss in this Part directly relate to the fair and efficient operation of the criminal
justice system, which I contend are matters over which the prosecutor has at least equivalent, if
not greater, day-to-day expertise than legislators. See infra Part IV.
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political leadership to the emerging movement to repeal mandatory
sentences. 79
A. Promoting Public Safety by Reducing Recidivism
Prosecutors should support repeal of mandatory sentences because in
many instances they do not adequately protect public safety. For certain
categories of offenders, extended periods of incarceration actually
increase, rather than decrease, the offender's risk of recidivism. Recent
studies suggest that for low- and medium-level offenders (such as drug
offenders and some property offenders) the longer they are imprisoned,
the higher the chance they will reoffend upon release.80 One reason
lengthy sentences may lead to an increase in recidivism is the
destruction of community ties necessary for successful reintegration.
When prison sentences are relatively short, offenders are more likely to
maintain their ties to family, employers and other members of their
community who will be important sources of physical, emotional and
financial support upon release.81 Moreover, incarceration itself has
79. A Committee of the American Law Institute ("ALI") has recently taken a very strong
position against mandatory minimum penalties in their tentative draft of the Model Penal Code
Sentencing Project. Composed of a distinguished and bipartisan group of judges, scholars,
government lawyers and defense counsel, the Committee has recommended that the ALI
strengthen its 1962 position that mandatory minimums are "unsound" in favor of a firm, black-
letter policy prohibiting such penalties. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.06 (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2011), available at http://www.ali.org/00021333/Model%2OPenal%2OCode%
20TD%2ONo%202%20-%20online%2Oversion.pdf. Subsection 6.06(3) of the draft would have
"the substantive effect, in adopting jurisdictions with pre-existing mandatory penalties in their
criminal codes, of repealing all such provisions." Id. In addition to arguments about
discriminatory impact, consistency of application and coercive effect, id. at 19-25, the ALI
Sentencing Project found fundamental flaws with mandatory penalties on the grounds of
proportionality. See id at 18 ("The interests of victims, and the community at large, in seeing
proportionate penalties visited on criminal offenders, are frustrated by a one-size-fits-all
punishment scheme.").
80. FORMAN & LARIVEE, supra note 35, at 6; Cassia Spohn & David Holleran, The Effect of
Imprisonment on Recidivism Rates of Felony Offenders: A Focus on Drug Offenders, 40
CRIMINOLOGY 329, 350 (2002); George Gascon, The Courage to Change: How Prosecutors Can
Lead on Public Safety, ROSENBERG FOUND., http://justiceinca.rosenbergfound.org/gascon.php
(last visited Aug. 23, 2013). But see David S. Abrams, Building Criminal Capital vs. Specific
Deterrence: The Effect of Incarceration Length on Recidivism 4 (Dec. 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/dabrams/workingpapers/Abrams
Recidivism.pdf (surveying the empirical studies and finding them mostly inconclusive due to
omitted variable bias on the question of whether shortening sentences decreases recidivism, but
suggesting that longer sentences lead to an increased severity of recidivating crime).
81. For a thoughtful critique of mandatory minimum sentences by an experienced federal
judge, see United States v. Bannister, 786 F. Supp. 2d 617 passim (E.D.N.Y. 2011). Judge
Weinstein not only suggests that mandatory sentencing may lead to greater recidivism for the
offender, see id at 658, but that the children of those incarcerated may be adversely affected due
to the impact of antisocial ethics and fatherlessness. See id. at 642; John Hagan & Ronit
Dinovitzer, Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment for Children, Communities and Prisoners,
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criminogenic effects on prisoners by socializing them into an outsider
culture and reinforcing criminal behavior; studies have shown that this
negative effect increases over the length of incarceration. 82 Finally,
when crimes carrying mandatory minimum penalties are reclassified so
that courts are given a choice between diversion and conviction (such as
for first-time narcotics offenses) 83 the choice to divert an offender can
reduce recidivism by sparing the offender many of the harsh collateral
consequences of criminal conviction including the loss of voting rights,
public housing and benefits and certain forms of employment licensure,
all of which might serve as barriers to successful re-entry. 84
Mandatory minimum sentencing may lead to higher recidivism for
reasons unrelated to the criminogenic effect of incarceration. Because
sentencing judges often perceive legislatively enacted mandatory
minimum sentences as too high, they frequently sentence an offender
convicted under such a statute to a "one-day" differential between the
minimum and maximum sentence (e.g., "five years to five years and
one day"). In states where parole eligibility is calculated off of the
minimum sentence, offenders have no incentive to apply for parole, and
are often "wrapping" to the street without any monitoring of their
behavior by a parole officer.85 Further, some state correctional
practices-either explicitly or functionally-preclude offenders serving
mandatory sentences from participating in valuable programming
(counseling, education, job training, etc.) while in prison. In many
states, for example, a prisoner's "earned good time" is deducted only off
of the maximum sentence, so offenders serving a mandatory minimum
term (e.g., "five years to five years and one day") are provided with
little incentive by the institution to participate in programming.
26 CRIME & JUST. 121, 122 (noting the effect on children from their parent's incarceration "may
be the least understood and the most consequential implication of the high reliance on
incarceration in America").
82. Martin H. Pritkin, Is Prison Increasing Crime?, 2008 Wis. L. REv. 1049, 1089-90
(cataloguing various criminogenic effects of prison).
83. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.03 (West 2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-370
(2013).
84. Lorelei Laird, Ex-Offenders Face Tens of Thousands of Legal Restrictions, Bias and
Limits on Their Rights, A.B.A. J. (June 1, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://www.abajoumal.com
/magazine/article/ex-offendersfacetensof thousandsoflegal restrictions/.
85. See GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CORR. REFORM, STRENGTHENING PUBLIC SAFETY,
INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY, AND INSTITUTING FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTION 44 (2004) (explaining that the practice of basing parole eligibility on the
minimum sentence precludes "both parole supervision" and "placement in pre-release"); Anne M.
Piehl, From Cell to Street: A Plan to Supervise Inmates After Release 13-14 (KSG Faculty
Research Working Paper Series, Paper No. RWPO2-005, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=299135.
998 [Vol. 45
(Ad)ministering Justice
Moreover, the length of sentence an offender will be serving affects an
evaluation of his escape risk, which in turn may affect his security
classification. Offenders serving mandatory minimum sentences are
typically classified to higher security prisons, with fewer enrichment
programs available to them. 86 Especially in states without established
correctional reentry programming and post-release supervision,87
mandatory sentencing schemes can become, by their very nature, a
barrier to successful re-entry.
Prosecutors should consider public safety their highest priority.
Attorney General Eric Holder recently stated in a widely covered public
address that "[t]oo many people go to too many prisons for far too long
for no good law enforcement reason." 88 For some crimes, such as
murder, protection of public safety through incapacitation might
justifiably be the government's primary objective, regardless of cost or
collateral consequences. But for most crimes, public safety is better
protected through shorter sentences coupled with re-entry programming
and post-release supervision.89 Failure to distinguish between these two
types of crime based on thoughtful criteria and objective, data-driven
research presents an obstacle to overall crime reduction.
B. Avoiding Undue Coercion
Prosecutors should oppose mandatory sentences for all but the most
serious, violent offenses, because such sentencing schemes have a
chilling effect on a defendant's exercise of her constitutional right to a
trial.90 Many judges and former prosecutors now candidly admit that it
is common for the government to use mandatory sentences as a
86. See FORMAN & LARIVEE, supra note 35, at 15-16. During the height of mandatory
sentencing (1990-2012), the percentage of Massachusetts prisoners incarcerated in maximum
security prisons rose from 8% to 18%, even though the percentage of prisoners serving time for
violent crime remained constant. Id at 15.
87. See Juliene James, A View from the States: Evidence Based Public Safety Legislation, 102
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 821, 834-48 (2012) (discussing recent legislative developments in
these two areas designed to reduce recidivism at a lower cost than incarceration); Piehl, supra
note 85, at 7, 19 (providing statistical data of a study of recidivism for the Massachusetts
Department of Correction).
88. Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., Address at the 15th Annual National Action Network
Convention (Apr. 4, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-
speech-130404.html.
89. See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, TIME SERVED: THE HIGH COST, Low RETURN OF LONGER
PRISON TERMS 35-38 (2012). The Pew Center Report also noted that instituting "comprehensive
pre-release planning" and proper levels of supervision alongside early release can help further
reduce the risk of recidivism. Id. at 38; see also Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., From
"Overcriminalization" to "Smart on Crime ": American Criminal Justice Reform-Legacy and
Prospects, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 597, 610-11 (2011).
90. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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bargaining chip to coerce guilty pleas. 91  When prosecutors have
discretion to charge a defendant with a crime carrying a harsh
mandatory penalty and then allow the defendant to plead guilty to a
lesser crime carrying a discretionary and lower penalty, this disparity
may exert unconscionable pressure on the defendant. 92 The threat of a
mandatory penalty might coerce even an innocent defendant to plead
guilty to a crime that she did not commit, or at least to forfeit an
otherwise colorable defense. 93
Imagine a defendant charged with trafficking in cocaine following an
undercover sale to a government agent. The defendant faces a
mandatory minimum term of ten years imprisonment under state law.
The defendant's sole role in the transaction was driving the principal to
the scene of the meeting, which occurred outside of the car the
defendant was driving. Imagine further that the government's proof that
the defendant intentionally and knowingly assisted the principal in the
drug transaction is very thin and there is no direct evidence that the
defendant handled the cocaine or participated in any prior negotiations
leading up to its sale. Notwithstanding an eminently triable case, the
defendant may experience irresistible pressure to plead guilty to a lesser
crime that does not carry a mandatory penalty, such as conspiracy to
distribute cocaine or possession of cocaine, simply to avoid the
draconian ten-year trafficking penalty.
As "(ad)ministers" of justice responsible for promoting and
safeguarding a fair system of criminal adjudication, prosecutors should
have grave concerns about this level of coercion. Comment [1] to ABA
Model Rule 3.8 states that a prosecutor's responsibility as a "minister of
justice" "carries with it specific obligations to see that . .. special
precautions are taken to prevent and to rectif the conviction of
innocent persons."94 One "special precaution" that prosecutors could
take to prevent the conviction of innocent persons is to advocate for
91. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Sentencing Shift Gives New Clout to Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 2011, at Al (quoting experiences of U.S. District Court Judge John L. Kane and
National District Attorneys Association Executive Director Scott Bums).
92. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARv. L. REV.
2463, 2486-87 (2004).
93. See Stephen Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1987 (1992)
(discussing distortions in plea bargaining due to pervasive conflicts of interest); see also Lafler v.
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Plea bargaining] presents grave
risks of prosecutorial overcharging that effectively compel[] an innocent defendant to avoid
massive risk by pleading guilty to a lesser offense.. . ."); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AN OFFER
You CAN'T REFUSE: How U.S. PROSECUTORS FORCE DEFENDANTS TO PLEAD GUILTY 7 (Dec.
2013), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usl213ForUpload0-O.pdf
(discussing how federal prosecutors use narcotics and weapons statutes to coerce guilty pleas).
94. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt.[1] (2013) (emphasis added).
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repeal of most mandatory sentences.
Certainly, mandatory sentences are not the only source of pressure on
defendants to plead guilty in the absence of strong evidence.
Defendants may plead guilty due to information deficits in discovery,
imbalance of resources in representation and investigation or pressure
from family and criminal associates. 95 But mandatory sentences are
now clearly playing a prominent, if not paramount, role in coercing
guilty pleas. Since the advent of mandatory sentencing in the 1980s, the
percentage of felony cases proceeding to trial in state and federal court
has dropped dramatically. 96  The greater the "trial penalty"-the
difference between the sentence the defendant is being offered during
plea bargaining before trial and the sentence she will receive after
trial-the greater the pressure to plead guilty. 9 7 That is why the
coercive effect of mandatory penalties for narcotics, property and
habitual nonviolent offenses should concern prosecutors the most: the
disparity between the sentence as charged and the sentence the
defendant will likely face upon a guilty plea may be so great that even
innocent defendants might take the deal.98
C. Reducing Discriminatory Impact
Following the public controversy surrounding George Zimmerman's
acquittal in Florida in July 2013, President Barack Obama called on this
country to begin an honest conversation about race relations in America.
In his comments, the President candidly acknowledged that young
African-American men are more likely to be both the perpetrators and
victims of violence in our society.99 But he also poignantly described
how innocent African-American men share in this stigma because they
95. See Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1121, 1175-
76 (1998); see also Janet Moore, Democracy and Criminal Discovery Reform after Connick and
Garcetti, 77 BROOK. L. REv. 1329, 1346-49 (2012) (highlighting weak enforceability of
prosecutors' due process discovery obligations); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship
Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 34-35 (1997) (arguing that
defendants with retained rather than appointed counsel have greater resources and incentive to
investigate and litigate criminal cases).
96. Oppel, supra note 91, at Al. According to the National Center for State Courts, the
percentage of felonies taken to trial in a study of nine states fell from 8% in 1976 to 2.3% in
2009. Id. According to a SUNY Albany study, the percentage of criminal cases taken to trial in
federal district courts fell from 15% in 1980 to less than 3% in 2010. Id.
97. Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings,
82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1239-40 (2008).
98. For crimes such as murder, for example, it may be less likely that a completely innocent
person would plead guilty to a twenty-year sentence for manslaughter, given the substantial time
and social stigma they would face even for the lesser included offense.
99. Matt Viser, In Words Revealing and Rare, Obama Speaks on Martin Case, Bos. GLOBE,
July 20, 2013, at AS.
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are more likely than other racial groups to be the target of suspicion and
differential treatment by the community.100 African-American men in
this country who are subject to profile stops by the police,10 or who are
routinely followed through department stores by security personnel,102
or who regularly hear the "click" of car doors being locked when they
pass by on the street, 103 certainly would not find it surprising that gross
racial disparities exist in the enforcement of this nation's mandatory
minimum sentences.
A prosecutor's decision to reduce charges is not subject to any
meaningful judicial reviewl 04 and is inadequately checked by the
political process. 05  This discretion is subject to whim, caprice,
arbitrary and irrational considerations,1 06 and, perhaps most dangerous
and corrosive of all, bias.107 "[T]he power to be lenient is the power to
100. "The African American community is also knowledgeable that there is a history of racial
disparities in the application of our criminal laws-everything from the death penalty to
enforcement of our drug laws." For a full transcript of the July 19, 2013 remarks, see Obama
Trayvon Martin Speech Transcript: President Comments on George Zimmerman Verdict,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 19, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/19/obama-trayvon-
martin-speech-transcriptn 3624884.htrnl [hereinafter Obama Transcript].
101. See Floyd v. City of New York, Nos. 08 Civ. 1034, 12 Civ. 2274, 2013 WL 4046217
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013) (issuing a permanent injunction against the New York Police
Department's stop and frisk policy in a section 1983 action, and finding that the policy violated
the equal protection clause in how the N.Y.P.D. applied it to African Americans and Hispanics),
stayed pending appeal sub nom. Ligon v. City of New York, Nos. 13-3123, 13-3088, 2013 WL
5835441 (2d Cir. Oct. 31, 2013).
102. Obama Transcript, supra note 100.
103. Id.
104. The decision whether to prosecute and what charges to bring generally rests in the
discretion of the prosecutor, and to succeed on an equal protection claim alleging impermissibly
selective prosecution the defendant must demonstrate not only discriminatory effect, but also
discriminatory purpose. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985); see also McCleskey
v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297, 313 (1987) (holding that a Georgia study showing racial disparity in
prosecutors' and jurors' invocation of the death penalty was not enough to demonstrate an equal
protection violation absent evidence of discriminatory purpose: "[w]here the discretion that is
fundamental to our criminal process is involved, we decline to assume that what is unexplained is
invidious"). Moreover, the Supreme Court has made it practically impossible for a defendant to
succeed on a claim of selective prosecution, because the defendant is not entitled to discovery
regarding decisions the prosecutor made in other cases unless and until he is able to make a
threshold showing of discriminatory treatment. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,
468 (1996).
105. See Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581,
591 (2009) [hereinafter How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us] (discussing the ways in which the
democratic process fails to create prosecutor accountability).
106. See Bjerk, supra note 11, at 622-23 (studying enforcement decisions under three-strikes
laws in twenty-four states and finding that prosecutors tend to circumvent mandatory minimum
laws due to their own preferences or constraints, rather than due to any predictions about what
judges, juries or defense attorneys will do).
107. See ANGELA DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR
4-5 (2007) (discussing prosecutors' disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants). Dean
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discriminate."108 As one former prosecutor courageously acknowledged
regarding the decision whether to seek the death penalty, "[t]he impact
of racism, when present in a district attorney's decision as to whom to
charge, at what level to charge, whether to seek capital punishment, and
whether to negotiate a plea to a lower charge and avoid capital
punishment cannot be exaggerated."1 09 After nearly thirty years of
experimentation with mandatory sentencing, the question for leaders in
law enforcement is whether the possible benefits of these penalties
outweigh the real and pernicious risk that they will be discriminatorily
applied.
The Vera Institute of Justice has been studying racial disparities in
charging and plea bargaining practices as part of their Prosecution and
Racial Justice Program. Several district attorneys' offices across the
country are participating in this pilot study, including chief prosecutors
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, San Diego, California and Mecklenburg,
North Carolina. Some of the initial findingsI 0 by the Vera Institute are
disturbing, and certainly support claims of racial disparity in the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion in charge reductions with regard to
crimes carrying mandatory minimum penalties. A 2012 meta-study by
the Vera Institute cited five independent empirical studies examining
the impact of race and ethnicity on charge reduction.111 One study of
drug offenses found that Hispanic defendants were significantly less
likely to have felony charges reduced to a misdemeanor than white
defendants, while African-American defendants were somewhat less
likely than white defendants to benefit from such a charge reduction. 112
James Vorenberg described a prosecutor's discretion in plea bargaining as "a powerful weapon
that he may use at his pleasure." James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94
HARV. L. REv. 1521, 1552 (1981).
108. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 170 (1980), cited in McCleskey, 481
U.S. at 312. The majority opinion in McCleskey went on to observe, however, that "a capital
punishment system that did not allow for discretionary acts of leniency 'would be totally alien to
our notions of criminal justice.' 481 U.S. at 312 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199
n.50 (1976)).
109. E. Michael McCann, Opposing Capital Punishment: A Prosecutor's Perspective, 79
MARQ. L. REV. 649, 675 (1996).
110. Generalizations about the presence or absence of bias in prosecution are difficult because
racial disparities vary by type of crime and level of court, and between case declinations at the
screening stage and case disparities at the time of plea bargaining.
111. BESII KUTATELADZE ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, Do RACE AND ETHNICITY
MATTER IN PROSECUTION? A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 13-14 (2012), available at
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/race-and-ethnicity-in-prosecution-
first-edition.pdf.
112. Id. at 13; see also Margaret Farnsworth et al., Ethnic, Racial, and Minority Disparity in
Felony Court Processing, in RACE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 54, 67 (Michael J. Lynch & E. Britt
Patterson eds., 1991) (reporting results of a study showing a significant disparity in charge
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Another study of weapons charges in federal court found that, in
general, African-Americans and Hispanics were less likely than whites
to have gun charges against them reduced.113 In Milwaukee, white
defendants received much more favorable outcomes at the district court
level than African-Americans or Hispanics, in terms of both case
declinations and reductions in charges.114
A 2007 study of charging practices by prosecutors in Pennsylvania
found that Hispanics arrested for a qualifying offense were significantly
more likely than whites to be charged under the applicable mandatory
minimum law, and females were significantly less likely to be charged
than males.115 Interestingly, this study found that the relatively modest
African-American/white difference in the application of the mandatory
minimum law increased in counties with higher African-American
populations, possibly due to the presence of a "racial threat" perception
by whites. 116
Georgia has one of the harshest mandatory penalties in effect in this
country for second-offense drug distribution. In 1990, the legislature
gave prosecutors the power to move for a mandatory sentencing
enhancement of life in prison for any defendant convicted a second time
of distributing, or possessing with intent to distribute, a Schedule I or
Schedule II narcotic.117 After four years of experience with this statute,
data provided by state officials revealed that 98.4% of the prisoners
serving life sentences under this statute were African Americans, and
that, of the convicted suspects eligible for this enhancement,
reductions for minority defendants compared to their white counterparts). The authors of the
study noted that "[slince the defendant's prior record may affect sanctioning decisions, the
analyses focus on convicted defendants with a previous court record." Id. at 60.
113. KUTATELADZE ET AL., supra note 111, at 13; see, e.g., Lauren O'Neill Shermer & Brian
D. Johnson, Criminal Prosecutions: Examining Prosecutorial Discretion and Charge Reductions
in US. Federal District Courts, 27 JUST. Q. 394, 416-17 tbl.3 (2010) (presenting statistical data
showing the disparity in charge reduction occurrences between Hispanic and African-American
individuals). In conducting their analysis, Shermer and Johnson controlled for other potentially
relevant variables, including the offender's criminal history, offense severity, number of charges
filed against the defendant and differences among federal district courts. Id. at 410-11.
114. Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On
Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 11Ith Cong. 38-39
(2009) (statement of Wayne S. McKenzie, Director, Prosecution and Racial Justice Program),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/printers/ 1I th/l 11-78_53093.PDF.
115. Jeffery T. Ulmer et al., Prosecutorial Discretion and the Imposition of Mandatory
Minimum Sentences, 44 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 427, 450 (2007). In conducting his analysis,
Ulmer controlled for other potentially relevant variables, including: the severity of the current
offense, mandatory eligible offense type and prior criminality of the offender. See id at 437.
116. Id. at451.
117. See Stephens v. Georgia, 456 S.E.2d 560, 561 (Ga. 1995) (describing the then-in-effect
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-30(d)).
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enhancement was applied for African-Americans in 16.6% of the cases
but applied for white defendants in less than 1% of the cases. 118
Notwithstanding this shocking disparity, the Georgia Supreme Court
denied an equal protection challenge to the statute on both federal and
state constitutional grounds, and ruled that the defendant had failed to
prove under McCleskey v. Kempi 9 that either the legislature had a
discriminatory intent in enacting the statute, or that the government
harbored a discriminatory motive in selecting those cases in which to
seek the enhancement. 120 This unrestrained prosecutorial power in
Georgia to select which habitual drug offenders would be subjected to
life imprisonment continued for another year until, in 1996, the state
legislature amended the statute to reduce the mandatory penalty to ten
years. 121
Prosecutors should feel ethically compelled to support legislative
reforml 22 of mandatory minimum penalties because such sentencing
schemes lay the seeds for discriminatory application. According to Pew
Center studies, one in nine African-American men between the ages of
twenty to thirty-four are behind bars, 123 and one in eleven African-
American adults of all ages are under some form of correctional control
either through incarceration, probation supervision or parole.12 4
African-Americans comprise only 12% of the U.S population, but they
make up nearly 50% of its prisoners. 125 This shocking statistic is
potentially misleading because African-Americans offend at
disproportionately higher rates for crimes of violence. 126 Nonetheless,
most knowledgeable observers believe that African-American citizens
are still overrepresented in our country's prison population, even if not
as much as the 12%-50% comparison would suggest.127 While implicit
118. Id.
119. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
120. Stephens, 456 S.E.2d at 561-62.
121. See Act of Apr. 15, 1996, No. 932, § 1.1, 1996 Ga. Laws 1023.
122. After setting a high bar for proving discriminatory motive for purposes of equal
protection claims in McCleskey, Justice Powell acknowledged that the legislature, not the courts,
is the appropriate forum for addressing more implicit forms of bias in the criminal justice system.
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 319.
123. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008, at 6 (2008).
124. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 5
(2009).
125. Pfaff, supra note 9, at 1109.
126. Id; see James Foreman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim
Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REv. 21, 46 (2012) ([T]he African American arrest rate for murder is seven
to eight times higher than the white arrest rate; and the black arrest rate for robbery is ten times
higher than the white arrest rate.").
127. Pfaff, supra note 9, at 1109.
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bias exists at multiple points in the criminal justice system-from police
investigation, through arrest, plea bargaining and jury selectionl 28-the
studies recounted above suggest that the transfer of unreviewable
sentencing discretion to prosecutors has exacerbated the problem.
D. Redirecting Financial Resources
Mandatory sentencing policies have proven to be prohibitively
expensive, which has led even some high-profile fiscal conservatives to
join in the so-called "Right on Crime" movement. 129 The annual cost of
incarcerating a state offender ranges from less than $15,000 (Kentucky),
to over $60,000 (New York).130 The rise of mandatory minimum
penalties has naturally led to longer prison terms: the average length of
stay for state convicts has increased by one-third since 1990.131 Over a
similar period, state prison expenditures have grown from $2.8 billion
to $50 billion.132 Prison systems are now the second-fastest growing
area of state budgets, trailing only Medicaid expenditures.133
While it might seem natural to assume that longer prison terms have
significantly increased public safety, there is little direct evidence to
support that view. It is true that crime rates began to fall nationally for
all classes of crime in the 1990s, shortly after the tidal wave of
mandatory sentences hit our nation's shores. 134 Yet, experts have
suggested that only about one-fourth to one-third of that decline is
attributable to the incapacitation of persons who otherwise would be
128. For example, the peremptory challenge has persisted in state and federal courts
notwithstanding pervasive evidence that prosecutors routinely employ implicit racial biases in the
jury selection process. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 269-70 (2005) (Breyer, J. concurring)
(urging reconsideration of the peremptory challenge because "the use of race- and gender-based
stereotypes in the jury-selection process seems better organized and more systematized than ever
before"); Mark W. Bennett, Unravelling the Gordian Knot ofImplicit Bias in Jury Selection: The
Problems ofJudge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions,
4 HARv. L. & POL'Y REv. 149, 150 (2010) ("[J]udge-dominated voir dire and the Batson
challenge process are well-intentioned methods of attempting to eradicate bias from the judicial
process, but they actually perpetuate legal fictions that allow implicit bias to flourish." (citation
omitted)).
129. See, e.g., Norquist, supra note 45 ("Viewed through the skeptical eye I train on all other
government programs, I have concluded that mandatory minimum sentencing policies are not
worth the high cost to America's taxpayers.").
130. CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RuTH DELANEY, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PRICE OF
PRISONS: WHAT INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS 10 (2012).
131. FORMAN & LARIVEE, supra note 35, at 5.
132. Caren Myers Morrison, Criminal Justice Responses to the Economic Crisis, 28 GA. ST.
U. L. REv. 953, 953 (2012) (foreword).
133. Viguerie, supra note 9, at A23.
134. See DON STEMEN, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, RECONSIDERING INCARCERATION: NEW
DIRECTIONS FOR REDUCING CRIME 2 (2007).
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engaged in criminal activity.135 Other factors contributing to the drop
in crime over the past dozen years include the aging of the baby boom
generation, having more police officers on the streets and the waning of
our nation's crack epidemic.136  Moreover, in the past ten years,
seventeen states have reduced their incarceration rates and also reduced
their crime rates, proving that it is possible for states simultaneously to
become safer and reduce their prison populations.137
Why should the high financial cost of incarceration be considered an
"ethical" problem for prosecutors? After all, state legislatures control
both the tax rate and departmental budgets. If legislators choose to
spend money unwisely on the prison-industrial complex,138 why should
state prosecutors have any ethical duty to object? Perhaps if the only
expenditures being sacrificed to support the high cost of prisons were
public transportation, education, health care and state infrastructure
needs, this might be a valid argument. But in the era of harsh fiscal
austerity that has plagued states since the recession of 2008, many
important criminal justice initiatives have fallen victim to the state
budget axe. 139 The more money that states spend on prisons, the less
money they will have to spend on other law enforcement initiatives that
more effectively prevent crime such as juvenile intervention, mental
health services, community policing, probation, re-entry programming
and parole supervision.
As "(ad)ministers of justice," prosecutors must construe their roles
broadly to include crime prevention, detection and enforcement, and
they must strive for the most effective balance of all three of these
important functions. Even if (as some critics have argued) mandatory
minimum sentences make the actual prosecution of crime less expensive
because they force pleas and decrease the number of trials, 140 they do so
at a prohibitively high price and to the detriment of other very
135. Id.; see also Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors
That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 179 (2004).
136. See Levitt, supra note 135, at 179.
137. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 89, at 7. The states are Alaska, California,
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, New
Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah and Wisconsin. Id. at 61 n.5.
138. Steven Donziger, The Prison-Industrial Complex: What's Really Driving the Rush to
Lock 'Em Up, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1996, at C3.
139. See Lanny Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Prepared Remarks at the National District
Attorneys Association Summer Conference (July 23, 2012), available at http://fednews.com/tran
script.html?item=20140327t5321&op-&addr-HGl-DFl-JUl-BB1 ("[Increasing numbers of
prisoners] ha[ve] resulted in prison and detention spending crowding out other criminal justice
investments, including aid to state and local law enforcement and spending on prevention and
intervention programs.").
140. See Barkow, supra note 11, at 728.
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compelling budgetary needs of the criminal justice community. This is
why the Department of Justice has launched the Justice Reinvestment
Initiative which encourages states to take a data-driven approach to
criminal justice policy, and to simultaneously reduce corrections
spending while allocating the resulting cost savings to public safety
strategies more likely to decrease crime and strengthen
neighborhoods.141
In light of the four very serious indictments of mandatory minimum
sentences identified above, why do so few chief prosecutors have the
courage to support their repeal? Some examples from recent state
reform efforts might shed light on prosecutorial motivations. In many
states, prosecutors routinely and reflexively oppose amendments to
mandatory minimum sentences: New York, California and Florida
provide good examples of this phenomenon. New York passed changes
to the harsh Rockefeller Drug laws in 2009142 over the opposition of the
state's district attorneys.143 California voters passed Proposition 36 in
2012 and restricted application of the state's harsh twenty-five-years-to-
life "three strikes" law to a third serious or violent felony,144 also over
the opposition of the California District Attorneys Association.145 In
Florida, bills have been filed to cut back on mandatory minimum
sentences for the past three legislative sessions, 146 and the Florida
Prosecuting Attorneys Association has successfully opposed these
measures each term. 147 The reason most frequently cited by prosecutors
141. See Justice Reinvestment Initiative (JRI), BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE, https://www.bja.
gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?ProgramID-92 (last visited Aug. 25, 2013). So far, seventeen states
have adopted the JRI model, and those states are predicted to save $3.3 billion over the next ten
years.
142. The New York legislation eliminated mandatory minimum sentences for first-time, low-
level drug felonies, gave judges discretion to send offenders to treatment instead of prison and
allowed for the early release of drug offenders previously sentenced to mandatory minimum
terms. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.70 (McKinney 2012).
143. Jeremy W. Peters, Albany Reaches Deal to Repeal '70s Drug Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
26, 2009, at Al.
144. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 2013); see Michael J. Mishak, Election 2012: Voters'
Reactions Mixed on Raft ofBallot Initiatives, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2012, at 1. The ballot initiative
approved by voters also allowed felons previously sentenced under section 667 for a third non-
qualifying felony to petition for resentencing. Mishak, supra.
145. Jack Leonard, Prop. 36 Seeks to Ease California's Three-Strikes Law, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
12, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/27/local/la-me-prop36-3strikes-20121028.
146. See H.B. 501, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013) (establishing judicial safety valve for
state's ten-twenty-life enhancement for use of firearm in course of felony); H.B. 561, 2012 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012) (adjusting threshold quantities for mandatory drug sentences); H.B. 917,
2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011) (eliminating mandatory sentences for narcotics offenses).
147. Greg Newburn, Why is Anyone Still Listening to Prosecutors on Mandatory-Minimums?,
SENTENCE SPEAK (Apr. 3, 2013), http://sentencespeak.blogspot.com/2013/04/why-is-anyone-
still-listening-to.html.
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for opposing repeal of mandatory sentences is the declining crime rate
since the 1990s: prosecutors typically point to the drop in crime as
evidence that harsh sentencing laws are working,148 notwithstanding
evidence from several studies that our nation's declining crime rate has
more to do with demographic shifts and changes in police practices than
with incapacitation.14 9 But what may really be motivating this reflexive
opposition is either an unstated recognition that mandatory minimum
sentences make the prosecutor's job easier by forcing guilty pleas,150
and/or a concern that a return of sentencing discretion to judges might
once again lead to unduly lenient sentences.
The experience in other states suggests that even when prosecutors
support limited reform of mandatory minimums, they do so as a result
of interest convergence' 5' rather than any principled opposition to such
harsh sentencing schemes. Massachusetts,152  Ohiol 53  and South
Carolinal 54 have all passed limited reforms to their drug-related
mandatory minimum penalties in the past four years. But these
amendments were all part of larger criminal justice packages that
contained additional tools for prosecutors unrelated to narcotics
enforcement. Prosecutors in these states seem to have been engaged in
horse trading-taking advantage of the political climate and declining
crime rates to strike a deal in order to gain other needed concessions
148. See id (summarizing opposition of Florida State's Attorney Brad King); see also Peters,
supra note 143, at Al (summarizing argument of New York District Attorney Michael Green).
149. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing the various factors responsible for
the drop in crime in the 1990s, and the effectiveness of each factor).
150. See Barkow, supra note 11, at 728; Oppel, supra note 91, at Al.
151. The interest convergence thesis posits that, historically, some social movements have
been successful when the interests of groups with different psychological motivations for
supporting the change coincide. See Stephen M. Feldman, Do the Right Thing: Understanding
the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 106 Nw. U. L. REv. ONLINE 248, 252 (2012) (explaining and
defending Derek Bell's interest convergence theory of school desegregation cases).
152. The Massachusetts Act reduced the school zone distance from 1000 feet to 300 feet,
reduced mandatory minimum terms for certain drug offenses by approximately 33% and reduced
the weight thresholds required for trafficking certain controlled substances. Act of Aug. 2, 2012,
ch. 192, 2012 Mass. Legis. Serv. (West).
153. The Ohio legislation eliminated the mandatory prison term for certain third-degree drug
felonies except where the offender had previously been convicted of a drug felony two or more
times, and substituted in its place a rebuttable presumption of incarceration. It also allowed
offenders previously sentenced to a mandatory prison term for drug offenses to apply for judicial
release upon expiration of 80% of their term. Act of June 29, 2011, file 29, 2011 Ohio Legis.
Serv. Ann. (West) (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.03(C)).
154. The South Carolina legislation eliminated mandatory sentences for first or second drug
offenses other than trafficking, amended the school-zone offense to require intent to commit the
offense within proximity of a school, park or playground and allowed for compassionate parole
for terminally ill or geriatric prisoners. Omnibus Crime Reduction and Sentencing Reform Act of
2010, act 273, 2010 S.C. Acts 1937.
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from the legislature.155  Even in California, where three district
attorneys broke ranks from the California District Attorneys Association
and publicly supported Proposition 36,156 the primary factor motivating
their support appeared to be that state prisons were severely
overcrowded and subject to a mandatory release order just recently
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court. 157 My research has
failed to uncover a single prosecutor who has publicly supported reform
of mandatory minimum penalties because she believed it was her ethical
responsibility to do so. The convergence of other interests and concerns
has provoked modest reforms in certain states, but it would be
refreshing if prosecutors spoke publicly about their ethical duty to
enhance the efficacy and fairness of the criminal justice system.
III. MITIGATING MANDATORY MINIMUMS: A PROSECUTOR'S ETHICAL
CONDUCT IN CHARGE BARGAINING
Ethical prosecutors striving for systemic fairness in punishment will
need to do more than advocate for sentencing reform. No matter how
successful their leadership and advocacy in this area, the political reality
is that some mandatory sentences-particularly for violent offenses-
will remain on the books.158 Legislators are unlikely to have the
155. Massachusetts may be a prime example of interest convergence at work. While the
Massachusetts District Attorneys Association ("MDAA") reflexively opposed the reform of that
state's narcotics penalties, District Attorney Gerry Leone of Middlesex County broke ranks with
the MDAA and supported Chapter 192 of the Acts of 2012. Matt Murphy, Prosecutors Knock
Patrick, Urge His Help to Pass 'True Anti-Crime Bill,' LOWELL SUN, July 24, 2012,
http://www.lowellsun.com/local/ci 21142760/prosecutors-knock-patrick-urge-his-help-pass-true.
Not coincidentally, Leone's jurisdiction included the town of Woburn, where a career criminal
with multiple prior incarcerations had a year earlier shot a police officer while on parole.
Jonathan Saltzman, DA Not Notified ofParole Hearing: Freed Lifer Killed Woburn Officer, BOS.
GLOBE, Dec. 30, 2011, http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/12/30/
danot notified-of parole_hearing/?page=l. The sentencing reform bill supported by Leone
contained a tough new habitual offender provision and revisions to the state parole board. See
Murphy, supra.
156. Leonard, supra note 145.
157. In a television advertisement, the District Attorneys for Los Angeles, San Francisco and
Santa Clara counties argued that Prop. 36 would reduce prison overcrowding and save the state
millions of dollars. Id; see also Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (affirming an order of a
9th Circuit Prison Litigation Reform Act panel that California must reduce its prison population
to 137.5% of the designed capacity within two years because overcrowded conditions violated the
Eighth Amendment rights of prisoners with medical conditions and mental health problems).
Even Attorney General Eric Holder's recent commitment to stop seeking federal charges that
carry mandatory minimum sentences in routine drug cases, discussed supra note 88 and
accompanying text, can be viewed as a form of interest convergence because the population of
federal prisons is presently 40% over capacity. See Charlie Savage, Dept. of Justice Seeks to
Curtail Strict Drug Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2013, at Al.
158. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2012) prescribes a mandatory sentencing
enhancement for possession, brandishing or discharge of a firearm during certain designated
(Ad)ministering Justice
motivation, courage or political will to repeal mandatory sentences for
highly dangerous crimes like homicide, repeat offender OUI or
aggravated sexual assault.159 The challenge for chief prosecutors is to
establish systems within their offices to help ensure that the substantial
discretion prosecutors retain with respect to these offenses is exercised
fairly, consistently and transparently. I propose an administrative check
on prosecutorial discretion with respect to charge bargaining of
mandatory minimum penalties, and I lay the groundwork below for an
internal regulatory structure that may be refined and adopted by state
prosecutors who are serious about fulfilling their obligations as
"ministers of justice."
Because we rarely rely on trials and the assessment of evidence to
mete out criminal justice in the United States, many scholars have
observed that our nation has moved from an adversarial criminal justice
system to an administrative criminal justice system.160 This school of
scholarship has begun to examine how internal office structures and
policies can be an important source of constraint on prosecutorial
discretion. Marc Miller and Ronald Wright, for example, have done
excellent work challenging us to think about internal regulation as a
source of meaningful constraint on prosecutorial discretion.161 They
argue that "internal executive regulation is an important and largely
unexplored path for legal reform" because it can lead to more
consistency and transparency in charging and plea bargaining
practices.162 Daniel Medwed has similarly challenged chief prosecutors
to guard against wrongful convictions by creating internal review
committees within their offices to approve key prosecutorial decisions
that may be affected by cognitive biases such as the decision whether to
oppose a motion for post-conviction relief claiming actual innocence, or
the decision to prosecute solely on the testimony of a single
eyewitness.16 3 Building on some of this great work, I propose a specific
felonies (five, seven and ten years, respectively). For a discussion of how frequently (and
inconsistently) this enhancement is charge-bargained away by federal prosecutors, see Ilene H.
Nagel & Stephen J Schulbofer, A Tale of Three Cities, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 551 (1992).
159. See Barkow, supra note 11, at 748 (describing effect of "outrage dynamic" in criminal
law); Stuntz, supra note 40, at 509, 553 (describing legislative enactments in the criminal law
area as a "one-way ratchet," because organized interest group pressure to narrow criminal liability
or punishment is exceptionally rare).
160. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 11, at 721-22.
161. Marc. L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 129 (2008)
[hereinafter The Black Box].
162. Id. at 196.
163. DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA'S RACE TO CONVICT AND ITS
IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT 22-24 (2012).
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and detailed form of internal self-regulation that could be successful in
constraining a prosecutor's charge bargaining decisions for crimes
carrying mandatory minimum sentences.
Attorney General Eric Holder's recent announcement that federal
prosecutors should now circumvent mandatory sentences for certain
drug traffickers by charging them without reference to the weight of the
drug distributed illustrates the importance of implementing internal
administrative checks on prosecutorial discretion.164 The Attorney
General did not commit to putting the full resources and credibility of
the Department of Justice behind efforts to repeal these draconian
federal drug laws. What the Attorney General committed to do was
essentially sidestep these statutes by issuing a directive to federal
prosecutors that they should use them only in certain aggravating
situations, such as where the narcotics distribution was part of high-
level organized criminal activity or involved the use, or threatened use,
of violence.165 This development on the federal level illustrates two
crucial points I have emphasized in this Article: (1) notwithstanding the
reform efforts I encourage, prosecutors are likely to continue to have
discretion to invoke mandatory minimum penalties for certain crimes
going forward, and (2) it is critical to adopt some form of transparent
guidelines to ensure that this substantial discretion is exercised in a
manner consistent with the public interest.
Although the ABA Criminal Justice Standards strongly encourage
chief prosecutors to establish internal guidelines and office policies to
guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, 166 few prosecutors'
offices presently do so. 167  Supervision in most district attorneys'
offices is informal and ad hoc; while approvals may be required within
the office before certain charges may be dismissed or reduced, there is
typically no official system in place to ensure that these decisions are
made in a consistent and principled fashion over time. 16 8 Given the size
164. For a full text of the Attorney General's remarks on August 12, 2013, see Eric Holder,
U.S. Attorney Gen., Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association's House of
Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-
speech-130812.html.
165. Todd Ruger, Holder Announces Shift against Mandatory Sentencing Laws, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 12, 2013, http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=12026151751 10/Holder-Announces-Shift-
Against-Mandatory-Sentencing-Laws?slreturn=20140207155856.
166. AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEF. FUNCTION
§ 3-2.5(a) (3d ed. 1993) (in order to "achieve a fair, efficient, and effective enforcement of the
criminal law," each prosecutor's office should develop statements of general policies to guide the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion and procedures of the office).
167. ALEXANDER, supra note 32, at 115 ("Most prosecutor's offices lack any manual or
guidebook advising prosecutors how to make discretionary decisions.").
168. Jonathan DeMay, A District Attorney's Decision Whether to Seek the Death Penalty:
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of many prosecutorial units, the frequent turnover in supervisory
positions within these offices and the limitations of human memory,
reliance on informal mechanisms of supervision is insufficient to assure
consistency and proportionality with regard to charge bargaining
decisions. 169
While prosecutors typically perceive themselves as acting in the
public interest and exercising reasoned discretion, 170 failure to identify
in writing the considerations that are guiding their choices promotes
inconsistency as well as idiosyncratic and seat-of-the-pants decision-
making. For this reason, I recommend that chief prosecutors adopt
written guidelines setting forth the factors that line prosecutors must
consider before recommending the reduction of any felony charge
carrying a mandatory minimum sentence. I also recommend that these
guidelines be published on the district attorney's website so that they
are available for inspection by the public and, most importantly, the
defense bar. Finally, and crucially, I recommend that prosecutors
establish small committees within their offices to consider and approve
requests to reduce any charges involving mandatory minimum
sentences. Line prosecutors would not be authorized to reduce such
charges unless they submitted a written request to the committee setting
forth their reasons for the charge reduction and obtained committee
approval. Defense attorneys should be allowed to petition the office
committee in writing for a charge reduction where the assigned line
prosecutor opposes it during plea negotiations. These relatively
straightforward steps would ensure that prosecutors make charge
reduction decisions based on articulable, readily identifiable principles
rather than based on caprice or personal bias. 171
It may seem counterintuitive to suggest that prosecutors should seek
permission to reduce a crime carrying a mandatory minimum penalty.
If such penalties are overly harsh in particular applications, why would
Toward an Improved Process, 26 FORDHAM. URB. L.J. 767, 788 (1999).
169. See Accountability Deficit for Prosecutors, supra note 42, at 1614. Elsewhere, Miller
and Wright explored prosecutors' declination decisions in four jurisdictions and concluded that
while such decisions are not truly "lawless" in the sense that they fail to comply with sound or
articulable legal or policy justifications, they are a form of reasoned discretion that now operates
"in the shadow of the law." The Black Box, supra note 161, at 131.
170. Id. at 168 (concluding after studying declination decisions that most prosecutors "feel
obliged to justify their choices based on public-regarding reasons").
171. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 70, at 886 ("[A]rticulating principles and
subprinciples of prosecution has value. It can make the exercise of discretion more thoughtful
and systematic, enable well-intentioned prosecutors to reach decisions with reference to
impersonal norms, narrow inconsistency within a prosecutor's office, and facilitate review by
supervisory prosecutors.").
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we want to create any barriers to the government's exercise of leniency?
Might such an approval process boomerang, and dissuade line
prosecutors from reducing charges? My hope and expectation is that
setting up an approval process to dismiss will cause prosecutors to be
more thoughtful and conscientious in making their charging decisions.
Due to the legislature's tendency to create overlapping crimes with
differing penalties, "a single criminal incident typically violates a half
dozen or more prohibitions" from which the prosecutor may choose in
fashioning criminal charges.172 If prosecutors know that they will need
to obtain permission to dismiss an offense carrying a mandatory
minimum sentence, they will think twice before charging it in the first
place, thereby reducing the tendency of some prosecutors to overcharge
solely to create leverage for a plea.173 By enacting a dismissal policy,
chief prosecutors would encourage prosecutors to be more realistic and
proportional in their charging decisions ab initio by constraining what
they will have the authority to do unilaterally down the road if they are
not. When prosecutors know that their conduct has consequences that
will later constrain their discretion, they are more likely to pay close
attention to the propriety of their initial charging decisions, rather than
reflexively charging the highest possible crimes.
My proposal borrows from the practice presently used by some
United States Attorneys' offices to authorize substantial assistance
departures in federal court. Federal law allows a judge to depart from a
mandatory sentencing provision of the United States Criminal Code if
the government files a motion averring that the defendant has provided
substantial assistance in the investigation and prosecution of others. 174
Substantial assistance motions in federal court, often known as "5Ki.1
motions," are uniquely within the discretion of the government.175
172. Stuntz, supra note 40, at 507. "The history of American criminal law is a history of
haphazard addition, with new offenses joined piecemeal to existing criminal codes." Id. at 583.
173. See Covey, supra note 97, at 1254-55 (distinguishing between charging unnecessarily
numerous offenses (horizontal overcharging), and charging crimes at a higher level than may be
warranted by the facts (vertical overcharging)). While Model Rule 3.8 ("Special Responsibilities
of a Prosecutor") does not explicitly condemn or prohibit the practice of either form of
overcharging so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the offense was
committed, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2013), the ABA Criminal Justice
Standards § 3-3.9 states that a prosecutor should not bring more or greater charges "than are
necessary to fairly reflect the gravity of the offense," AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEF. FUNCTION § 3-3.9 (3d. ed. 1993).
174. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2012).
175. Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REv. 105, 109 (1994) ("While theoretically the
judge has the last word on whether the defendant receives a downward departure for substantial
assistance, in practice, the government motion requirement of section 5K1.1 gives the prosecutor
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Section 5K1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines requires a motion by
the government, but it does not set forth any standards for what
constitutes "substantial" assistance, or how a prosecutor should exercise
discretion in making such a determination. 176 As a procedural matter,
the United States Attorneys' Manual requires that all substantial
assistance motions be approved in advance by either the jurisdiction's
U.S. Attorney, its Chief Assistant U.S. Attorney, a supervisory criminal
Assistant U.S. Attorney or "a committee including at least one of those
individuals." 177 Many, but not all, U.S. Attorneys' offices across the
country are now utilizing intra-office "substantial assistance" or
"downward departure" committees to approve such motions, in an
attempt to achieve some consistency regarding what level and type of
cooperation will suffice to warrant a departure.178
My proposed framework with regard to state charge bargaining
practices goes beyond this federal experience under 5Ki.1 in three
important respects: (1) it applies to all decisions to reduce a felony
charge carrying a mandatory minimum penalty, not just those based on
cooperation; (2) it encourages prosecutors to adopt and publish written
standards to guide the committee's determinations;179 and (3) it allows
a defense attorney to make a submission to the committee in writing if
he or she believes that a prosecutor is acting unreasonably in refusing to
reduce a charge.
the ultimate authority to decide whether a defendant will receive such a departure."); see Wade v.
United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186 (1992) (holding that the government's decision not to file a
substantial assistance motion was not subject to review by the court at request of the defendant
unless the defendant makes a "substantial threshold showing" that it was motivated by an
unconstitutional consideration, such as race or religion); United States v. Zingsheim, 384 F.3d
867, 872-73 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the court was without authority to issue a standing
order requiring prosecutors in the district office to utilize a committee to make substantial
assistance determinations and to require 5Kl.1 motions to be accompanied by a written report
from the committee containing the signatures of the committee members and the reasons for their
decisions).
176. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 5K1.1 (2013); see also LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD
& JOHN H. KRAMER, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE: AN EMPIRICAL
YARDSTICK GAUGING EQUITY IN CURRENT FEDERAL POLICY AND PRACTICE 3 (1998) (noting
that there is "scant instruction" regarding the terms and policies contained within the substantial
assistance statement).
177. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-27-400 (1997)
[hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL].
178. MAXFIELD & KRAMER, supra note 176, at 7; Lee, supra note 175, at 126; see also
Michael Simon, Departing Ways: Uniformity, Disparity and Cooperation in Federal Drug
Sentences, 47 VILL. L. REV. 921, 944-51 (2002) (documenting disparity among districts).
179. While a survey of U.S. Attorneys' offices revealed that many jurisdictions now have
internal written policies describing what conduct by the defendant will and will not be considered
as rising to the level of substantial assistance, MAXFIELD & KRAMER, supra note 176, at 24, these
policies typically are not published and are not available to the defense.
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I also recommend that chief prosecutors include on their mandatory
departure committees a retired judge, lay citizen or a member of their
staff who has previous experience representing criminal defendants.
Many scholars have justifiably lamented that prosecutors often become
entrenched in their adversarial roles, and fail to perceive or credit
contrary viewpoints. 80 "A veneer of toughness, even cynicism" can be
characteristic of long-term players in a district attorney's office. 18 1 The
more seniority a supervising prosecutor has, the more likely her
perspective might become both insular and jaded. Having fresh voices
at the table when charge reduction decisions are made can discourage
"groupthink," and can help to assure that the public interest broadly
conceived is being adequately advanced in these important discretionary
decisions. 182
Guidelines regarding charge bargaining need not be overly long and
complex. At a minimum, I would suggest that chief prosecutors
recognize the following factors as grounds for reducing felony charges
carrying mandatory penalties:
(1) Anticipated problems of proof at trial;
(2) Substantial cooperation by the defendant in the investigation or
prosecution of other serious criminal offenders;
(3) The chance that the mandatory sentence would frustrate
rehabilitation of the offender and/or increase her risk of reoffending;
(4) Whether the defendant is a youthful offender between the ages of
seventeen and twenty-one;
(5) Whether the mandatory sentence would be grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of the offense as committed,183 for one
or more of the following reasons:
* There was no physical injury to others;
180. See, e.g., Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 355, 378 (2001) ("Too often prosecutors believe that because it is their job to do
justice, they have extraordinary in-born wisdom and insight. Too often prosecutors believe that
they and only they know what justice is."); Stuntz, supra note 40, at 581 (describing a culture
where prosecutors see themselves as "czars of their dockets, dispensing justice as they see fit").
18 1. Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims
ofInnocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 140 (2004).
182. Burke, supra note 67, at 709-11.
183. At first blush, these considerations of proportionality might seem contrary to my earlier
argument that calibrating appropriate punishment in light of the multiple aims of criminal
sentencing is primarily a legislative concern. See supra note 78. But it shows no disrespect for
legislative primacy in the criminal law to recognize that there could be situations where the
legislature, if it had been able to envision an outlier situation presented by the unique
circumstances of an individual case, would likely not have chosen to impose a harsh mandatory
sentence.
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* The defendant did not carry, brandish or use a weapon;
* The defendant has no prior record of felony conviction;
* The defendant played a very minor role in a joint criminal
enterprise;
* The defendant's mental capacity was impaired at the time of the
crime;
* The defendant is charged as a habitual offender, and there was a
substantial time lapse (e.g., seven or more years) between one or
more of the predicate offenses.
Offices should develop an approval form containing a checklist of
these factors (as well as any other factors that the chief prosecutor may
identify) along with a narrative section requiring that line prosecutors
provide a brief factual description of the case and any additional reasons
supporting the proposed charge reduction.
The factors I have identified above are not novel. In my experience,
many prosecutors already consider them, or some constellation of them,
in determining when to dismiss or reduce charges carrying mandatory
minimum penalties.184 Yet they do so in an informal, ad hoc and
nontransparent fashion. The challenge for chief prosecutors is to
formally identify the factors that will justify treating certain cases as
outliers, and then to leave a trail in their wake explaining to others why
184. Charge bargaining around mandatory sentences is prevalent in federal practice. See
Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering Wound, 51 DUQ. L.
REV. 673, 703 (2013). In 2003, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a guideline requiring
federal prosecutors to charge and pursue the highest, most readily proven offense supported by
the evidence. See Amie N. Ely, Prosecutorial Discretion as an Ethical Necessity: The Ashcroft
Memorandum's Curtailment of the Prosecutor's Duty to "Seek Justice," 90 CORNELL L. REV.
237, 252 (2004). However, that mandate has been softened somewhat by subsequent directives.
The current Justice Department policy, as reflected in the US. Attorneys' Manual, provides:
If a prosecution is to be concluded pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant should
be required to plead to a charge or charges: That is the most serious readily provable
charge consistent with the nature and extent of his/her criminal conduct;
That has an adequate factual basis;
That makes likely the imposition of an appropriate sentence and order of restitution, if
appropriate, under all the circumstances of the case; and
That does not adversely affect the investigation or prosecution of others.
U.S ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 177, § 9-27.430 (emphasis added). The italicized
language above suggests that proportionality of the sentence, the extent of the defendant's
participation in a joint criminal enterprise and the defendant's cooperation in investigation of
others, are all appropriate considerations for a federal prosecutor to weigh in determining whether
to reduce a charge carrying a mandatory sentence. Comment I to this section of the US.
Attorneys' Manual further provides that "[e]xcept in unusual circumstances, this charge [to which
the defendant pleads guilty] will be the most serious one" but "[t]he requirement that a defendant
plead to a charge, that is consistent with the nature and extent of his/her conduct is not inflexible."
Id. cmt.1.
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those cases were considered outliers in the first place. While mercy is
an important consideration for public prosecutors in fulfilling their role
as "ministers of justice," 85 the factors that call for mercy should not be
left to the individual discretion of line prosecutors.186
Many of the factors I have identified above are presently recognized
as grounds for judicial departure from mandatory sentences under
certain limited federal and state safety valve statutes. 187 But judicial
safety valves are insufficient to eradicate the harshness and inequities of
mandatory sentencing schemes for at least two reasons: first, not all
states have adopted them;' 88 second, in the federal system and those
states that have safety valves, the judiciary is usually provided
discretion to deviate from a mandatory minimum sentence only for a
very narrow class of crimes. 189  Self-regulation by prosecutors to
constrain and justify the exercise of their discretion will continue to be
necessary for crimes in the majority of states that have not enacted
judicial safety valves, and even in minority states for those crimes that
are not subject to safety valve treatment.
In addition to promoting consistency, this proposed internal
administrative process would also promote transparency and
accountability. Prosecutors in the United States earn very low grades
for any kind of transparency, internal or external.190 Although
prosecutors are now widely recognized as the most powerful players in
the criminal justice system, 19 1 there is very little public awareness of
185. Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U.
PA. L. REv. 959, 994 (2009) (arguing that justice requires the prosecutor to view the defendant as
a human being sometimes deserving of mercy).
186. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy,
121 HARv. L. REV. 1332, 1354 (2008) (explaining that prosecutorial power to be lenient has not
undergone the same level of scrutiny as other pockets of mercy-such as executive clemency and
jury nullification-because of deference to prosecutorial expertise).
187. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-283a (2013); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-18-222 (2013).
188. See Safety Valve Fact Sheet, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS (July 17,
2012), http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/FS%20Safety/o20valves%20in%20a%20nutshell
%206.27.12.pdf (enumerating the small number of states with safety valve provisions and
detailing their contents).
189. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (federal safety valve applies only to possession,
distribution or conspiracy to distribute certain controlled substances); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2la-
283a (safety valve applies to designated narcotics offenses); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1252(5-
A) (2013) (safety valve applies to designated narcotics offenses); MINN. STAT. § 609.11 subdiv.8
(2013) (safety valve applies to employing a dangerous weapon in the commission of enumerated
offenses).
190. The Black Box, supra note 161, at 194.
191. See ALEXANDER, supra note 32, at 115; Bibas, supra note 185, at 959 ("No government
official has as much unreviewable power or discretion as the prosecutor."); Stuntz, supra note 40,
at 577.
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(and debate about) the principles that guide their substantial
discretion. 192 Establishing guidelines regarding when charges carrying
mandatory sentences will be dismissed, and collecting data about how
often such dismissals are agreed to and for what reasons, would allow
voters to assess in a meaningful way whether the performance of the
district attorney is in line with public values.193
To date, very few state prosecutors have established written standards
for their offices with regard to charge bargaining. Prosecutors in this
country prefer to operate under an unofficial and subterranean system of
internal controls, so that deviation from office policy cannot be
scrutinized by judges, defense attorneys or the public. Moreover, they
resist adopting charge reduction guidelines-or guidelines of any sort-
out of fear that such standards will be used as "litigation weapons."' 94
But this fear is misplaced. The United States Attorneys' Manual, which
contains detailed charging and plea bargaining guidelines for federal
prosecutors, contains a clear disclaimer that those guidelines are
advisory only, and confer no substantive or procedural rights on a
defendant. 195 Federal courts have balked at any attempt by defense
192. Roger Fairfax, Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1269 (2010).
193. See How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, supra note 105, at 606-07. The vast majority of
prosecutors are directly elected, usually at the local level. See STEVEN W. PERRY & DUREN
BANKS, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2007 - STATISTICAL TABLES
2 (2011) (noting that Alaska, Delaware, Connecticut and Rhode Island have a single prosecutor's
office for the entire state); STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., PROSECUTORS IN STATE
COURTS, 2005, at 2 (2006) (noting that chief prosecutors are directly elected in all states except
for Alaska, Connecticut, the District of Columbia and New Jersey). This holds out the promise
that a prosecutor's discretionary power will be checked at the voting booth. However, the
available data suggests that prosecutor elections do not effectively ensure that the power of the
office is exercised consistently with the will of the public. See Bibas, supra note 185, at 984;
How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, supra note 105, at 591. In the first place, incumbent
prosecutors rarely lose elections, winning 95% of the time when they run for reelection. How
Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, supra note 105, at 592. In part, this is driven by a paucity of
challengers: 85% of incumbent prosecutors run for reelection unopposed. Id. at 593. By
comparison, state legislators run unopposed only 35% of the time. Id. at 594. Even in those races
where a challenger does appear, the rhetoric of the campaign tends to focus on a few sensational
high-profile cases or the personal qualities of the chief prosecutor generally, rather than on more
useful measures of competence and policy. Bibas, supra note 185, at 987 (characterizing
prosecutor elections as "driven by unreliable anecdotes and scandals rather than more meaningful
statistics and policies"); How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, supra note 105, at 597 (citing a lack
of debate in prosecutor elections over the values that set the priorities and policies of the office).
This focus prevents the voting public from realistically assessing the performance of the
prosecutor's office to determine if prosecutorial discretion is being used in line with public
values. See Bibas, supra note 185, at 987; How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, supra note 105, at
597. Prosecutors are rarely called to account for their performance, and when they are, the indicia
presented to voters do not accurately reflect the operation of the office.
194. DeMay, supra note 168, at 789-90.
195. "The principles set forth herein, and internal office procedures adopted pursuant hereto,
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attorneys to use the Manual to force or prohibit prosecutorial action
otherwise meeting statutory and constitutional requirements. 196 In the
State of Washington, the Kitsap County Prosecuting Attorney has
published "Standards and Guidelines" that govern the discretion of
prosecutors in his district. These guidelines cover charging, sentencing
recommendations, pretrial diversion and statements to the press.197 The
Introductory Note to the guidelines similarly states that:
[T]hese Standards and Guidelines are advisory only. The only right or
entitlement they are intended to create is the right to a careful review
by this office. They are specifically not intended to, nor do they,
confer any other substantive or procedural rights or entitlements on
any person or persons.198
Such disclaimers are not only sensible, but also eminently enforceable
should unique or unforeseeable circumstances warrant a departure from
office policy.
In addition to promoting consistency, transparency and
accountability, an internal approach to regulating prosecutorial
discretion has the added advantage of giving chief prosecutors the data
they need to see how their subordinates utilize discretion over time, and
to manage that discretion in a more proactive manner. 199 When
managers in a prosecutor's office can analyze data on charge reductions
across crimes and across time, they can track and detect disparities in
charge bargaining with respect to race, gender and age. They can also
identify prosecutors who either too frequently request authority to
are intended solely for the guidance of attorneys for the government. They are not intended to, do
not, and may not be relied upon to create a right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable
at law by a party to litigation with the United States." U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note
177, § 9-27.150.
196. See United States v. Wilson, 413 F.3d 382, 389 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Blackley,
167 F.3d 543, 548-49 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (explaining that the Manual does not give rise to any
"cause of action or remedies" when a prosecutor has deviated from it).
197. RUSSELL D. HAUGE, KITSAP CNTY. PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, MISSION STATEMENT
AND STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES passim (2007), available at http://www.kitsapgov.com/pros/
StandardsGuidelines2007.pdf. While the Kitsap County guidelines on charge reductions are not
as complete or detailed as I recommend above, they do echo many of the same themes. A Kitsap
County prosecutor may agree to allow a defendant to plead guilty to a lesser charge: in order to
correct an error in the initial charging decision; in order to obviate anticipated evidentiary
problems at trial; in light of facts discovered after charging that mitigate the seriousness of the
defendant's conduct; or after reconsidering the charging factors described elsewhere in the
guidelines. Id. at 9.
198. Id. at 5.
199. See The Black Box, supra note 161, at 187 (identifying the benefits a prosecutor's office
could receive by compiling data); see also Bibas, supra note 185, at 989-90 (arguing that for
stakeholder pressure to succeed, chief prosecutors need to find a way to align the interests of line
prosecutors with their boss's priorities).
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charge bargain away mandatory minimum sentences (perhaps
identifying patterns of overcharging), or who very seldom do so
(perhaps identifying undue rigidness in plea bargaining). Finally, they
can identify those crimes that carry mandatory minimum sentences that
their offices most routinely reduce, and use this information to fulfill
their responsibility as agents of law reform 200 to support legislative
change.201 Implementing explicit guidelines and approval mechanisms
would thus set the stage for an internal sentencing information system
that would allow managers to better track decisions and monitor them
for consistency and efficacy. 202
Some commentators have argued that guidelines are ineffective; that
is, guidelines inevitably will be either too specific to be helpful given
the wide variety of factual circumstances presented by criminal conduct,
or they will be too general to bind a line prosecutor's discretion in any
meaningful fashion.203 But the recent experience in two states, Florida
and New Jersey, suggests an opposite conclusion. In Florida, the
Prosecuting Attorneys Association ("FPAA") adopted voluntary
standards to guide prosecutors' discretion in charging offenders under
the state's extremely broad habitual offender statute. 204  After the
Florida legislature began to consider amending the habitual offender
statute in response to claims that it was being utilized in a racially
biased fashion, the FPAA drafted and implemented statewide guidelines
setting forth criteria prosecutors would follow for determining whether
to charge an arrested suspect as a habitual offender. 205 Under the
guidelines, an indictment not meeting the express criteria must be
accompanied by a written statement of reasons signed by the designated
Assistant Attorney General and the elected State's Attorney explaining
why the prosecutor considered deviation from the guidelines
appropriate, and that statement must be filed not only with the court but
200. See supra Part II.
201. Describing criminal justice initiatives in North Carolina such as the Racial Justice Act
and the State Sentencing Commission, Professor Janet Moore has argued that the collection of,
and access to, hard data about criminal prosecutions is essential to politically effective action to
promote law reform. Janet Moore, Oppositional Politics in Criminal Law and Procedure, UTAH
L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-2214637.
202. Cf Marc L. Miller, A Map of Sentencing and a Compass for Judges: Sentencing
Information Systems, Transparency, and the Next Generation of Reform, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1351, 1370 (2005) (arguing that transparency and searchability of data should be a priority for the
next generation of sentencing reforms).
203. See Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutorial Guidelines and the New Terrain in New Jersey, 109
PENN. ST. L. REV. 1087, 1102 n.67 (2005) [hereinafter Prosecutorial Guidelines in New Jersey]
(collecting sources).
204. FLA. STAT. § 775.084 (2013).
205. The Black Box, supra note 161, at 192-93.
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also with the FPAA. 206 These guidelines are very specific, and require
consideration of such factors as the nature and grade level of the current
and predicate offenses, the number of prior convictions required for
various level felonies and the intervening time period between
convictions. 207
In New Jersey, the state supreme court has required prosecutors to
articulate guidelines on prosecutorial prerogatives that affect mandatory
sentencing. 208 In State v. Lagares, the defendant was charged with
possession with intent to distribute cocaine after previously having been
convicted of marijuana possession. 209 The New Jersey repeat offender
drug law allowed a prosecutor to apply for an extended mandatory
term-at her sole discretion-for a second-time drug offender. The
court noted that sentencing is traditionally a function of the judiciary,
and that the statute's goal of uniformity would be undermined if a
prosecutor had unfettered authority to select which defendants would be
subject to the increased sentence and which ones would get favorable
treatment. 210 In order to save the statute from constitutional infirmity,
the court construed the statute to require articulation of written
guidelines by the prosecutor's office, a statement of reasons on the
record at the time of a plea for the waiver or dismissal of the mandatory
drug term and an "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review by the
trial judge.2 11 While Lagares and its progeny allowed individual county
prosecutors to adopt different policies based on an Attorney General
206. FLA. PROSECUTING ATrORNEYS' Ass'N, STATEMENT CONCERNING IMPLEMENTING OF
HABITUAL OFFENDER LAWS § I(D) (1993), reprinted in MARC MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 181-82 (3d ed. 2007).
207. Id
208. See Prosecutorial Guidelines in New Jersey, supra note 203, at 1103.
209. State v. Lagares, 601 A.2d 698, 700 (N.J. 1992).
210. Id at 704.
211. Id. at 704-05.
Because we are not familiar with all of the factors that law-enforcement agencies might
consider significant in determining whether a defendant should be exempted from an
extended sentence, we request that the Attorney General, in consultation with the
various county prosecutors, adopt guidelines for use throughout the state. Such
guidelines will promote uniformity and provide a means for prosecutors to avoid
arbitrary or abusive exercises of discretionary power. Moreover, to permit effective
review of prosecutorial sentencing decisions, prosecutors must state on the trial court
record the reasons for seeking an extended sentence. Such a statement will provide for
effective judicial review and will help to insure that prosecutors follow the guidelines
in each case.
Id. at 704. In State v. Vasquez, the New Jersey Supreme Court applied the Lagares rationale to a
prosecutor's refusal to waive a mandatory parole disqualifier in a drug statute. State v. Vasquez,
609 A.2d 29, 32 (N.J. 1992) (similar considerations for judicial oversight are "mandated to
protect against arbitrary and capricious prosecutorial decisions.").
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model, two years after these decisions, the New Jersey Supreme Court
mandated that charging and plea bargaining standards with respect to
mandatory drug sentences be issued and enforced statewide. 212 These
guidelines in New Jersey that govern when a prosecutor may waive or
reduce an otherwise mandatory term of imprisonment are now known as
the "Brimage Guidelines." 2 13  Although these guidelines are highly
specific regarding when a mandatory drug sentence may be waived and
the degree of sentencing concession that may be awarded, they permit
general consideration of the defendant's cooperation with the
government, lack of use of a weapon, lack of threatened injury, lack of
direct connection to school property in a school zone case and the
prosecutor's assessment of the likelihood of obtaining a conviction
following trial.
The New Jersey experience with the Brimage Guidelines provides a
useful lesson in the role that the judiciary can play in promoting self-
regulation by prosecutors. Courts in the United States typically operate
within a tradition of deference to executive discretion in charging and
charge reduction decisions. 214 To reduce charges carrying a mandatory
sentence, prosecutors either need to dismiss the charge outright, or
partially dismiss the charge by deleting the factual allegation of an
element of the crime that triggers the mandatory sentencing provision
(e.g., deleting an allegation that a drug sale occurred within a school
zone). Courts typically steer clear of reviewing such dismissal
decisions for fear of interfering with core executive functions. 2 15 But in
most states, prosecutors must seek leave of court to dismiss or partially
dismiss a complaint or indictment, and it is within the court's discretion
to require a statement of the prosecutor's reasons for doing so. 2 16
212. State v. Brimage, 706 A.2d 1096, 1107 (N.J. 1998) ("Any flexibility on the basis of
resources or local differences must be provided for and explicitly detailed within uniform,
statewide guidelines.").
213. N.J. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., BRIMAGE GUIDELINES 2 (2004), available at
http://www.nj.gov/lps/dcj/agguide/directives/brimagerevision.htm.
214. Accountability Deficit for Prosecutors, supra note 42, at 1607.
215. Prosecutorial Guidelines in New Jersey, supra note 203, at 1103.
216. An extensive discussion of the difference between a nolle prosequi and a motion to
dismiss is beyond the scope of this Article. The modern analogue to the "nolle pros" is the
dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint without prejudice upon leave of the trial
court. Some states and the federal system have explicitly abolished the common law nolle pros,
and a motion to dismiss is the prosecutor's exclusive avenue for terminating a prosecution short
of trial or plea. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1386 (West 2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-3505
(2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 816 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.757 (2013). In those
jurisdictions, the governing statute or rule of criminal procedure will dictate whether the
prosecutor is required to state reasons for the motion, and whether those reasons may be given
orally or must be in writing. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a) (allowing an attorney for the government
to file a dismissal of the indictment "with leave of court"); United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d
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Courts interested in promoting prosecutors' transparency and
accountability can require a statement of reasons for dismissals, 217
preferably in writing, beyond the generic, overused and highly
uninformative, "such dismissal would be in the best interests of justice."
If it is necessary to protect the safety of a witness or the integrity of an
ongoing investigation, prosecutors can be allowed to submit their
statement of reasons under seal. 2 18
Requiring prosecutors to articulate more detailed reasons for their
dismissal decisions would have two salutary effects. First, such conduct
by judges is likely to prompt a prosecutor's office to develop a written
set of permissible criteria for charge reductions so as to avoid having
line prosecutors embarrass the office by stating on the record
justifications not reasonably supported by legitimate considerations of
public safety.2 19 Second, this practice would allow defense attorneys to
615, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (interpreting "leave of court" requirement in FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a) to
require "exposure of the reasons for dismissal;" the court generally "will not be content with a
mere conclusory statement by the prosecutor that dismissal is in the public interest, but will
require a statement of reasons and underlying factual basis"); 21 AM. JUR. 2d CRIMINAL LAW §
725 ("[S]ome such rules require the prosecutor to state on the record the reasons for the
dismissal."). Other states that have retained the common law power of a prosecutor to enter a
nolle pros have modified that power by statute to require "leave of court" "upon good cause
shown," which implicitly requires a statement of reasons by the prosecutor for dismissal. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-265.3 (2013) ("Nolle prosequi shall be entered only in the discretion of the
court, upon motion of the Commonwealth with good cause therefor shown." (emphasis added));
State v. Mucci, 782 N.E.2d 133, 139 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) ("The prosecuting attorney shall not
enter a nolle prosequi in any cause without leave of the court, on good cause shown, in open
court. A nolle prosequi entered contrary to this section is invalid." (emphasis added)); see also
HAW. REv. STAT. § 806-56 (2013) ("No nolle prosequi shall be entered in a criminal case in a
court of record except by consent of the court upon written motion of the prosecuting attorney
stating the reasons therefor." (emphasis added)); WASH. SUP. CT. CRIM. R. 8.3(a) ("The court
may, in its discretion, upon written motion of the prosecuting attorney setting forth the reasons
therefor, dismiss an indictment, information or complaint." (emphasis added)).
217. The ABA Criminal Justice Standards suggest that "whenever felony charges are
dismissed by way of nolle prosequi (or its equivalent) the prosecutor should make a record of the
reasons for the action." AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION &
DEF. FUNCTION § 3-4.3 (3d ed. 1993).
218. Many federal district courts have enacted local rules that permit a 5K1l1 motion
(substantial assistance) to be filed under seal. See, e.g., N.D. IND. LOCAL R. 5-3, available at
www.innd.uscourts.gov/docs/localrules/r.pdf; E.D.N.C., ELECTRONIC CASE FILING
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL 28 (2010), available at www.nced.
uscourts.gov/pdfs/cmecfPolicyManual.pdf. Other jurisdictions do this as a matter of routine
practice. Raymond Dearie, Panel Five: Cooperation and Plea Agreements - Judges' Roundtable,
79 FORDHAM L. REv. 85, 85-86 (2010).
219. The experience in New Jersey provides a useful lesson in this interplay between judicial
and executive power over mandatory sentencing, and the role that judges can play in encouraging
self-regulation by prosecutors in this area. In the trio of cases from Lagares to Brimage, the New
Jersey Supreme Court ruled that, since sentencing is a core judicial function, it would violate
separation of powers principles under the state constitution to allow prosecutors unfettered and
unreviewable discretion to reduce or dismiss drug charges carrying a mandatory minimum
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advocate for equitable and consistent treatment for their clients by
analogy to like cases.220 When prosecutors fail to put their reasons for
dismissals on the record, they create an impediment to defense attorneys
researching a history of how similar cases have been treated in their
districts over time.
CONCLUSION
As "(ad)ministers of justice," prosecutors must foster and promote a
criminal justice system that is consistent, transparent and fair. Because
each of these systemic goals is undermined by most mandatory
minimum sentencing schemes, prosecutors across this country should
join in the growing movement to repeal such statutes. Prosecutors
should also reform their charge reduction policies concerning those
mandatory minimum penalties that remain on the books, in order to
better fulfill their obligation to promote consistent plea bargaining
practices within their offices. The internal regulatory framework
proposed in this Article is not a substitute for the elimination of
mandatory sentences for most nonviolent drug and property offenses,
but it will properly supplement such reform by providing a meaningful
constraint on prosecutorial discretion.
sentence, because then complete sentencing authority would be effectively transferred to the
executive. The Court thus used the power to require the prosecutor to state reasons for the
dismissal as a way to leverage advance articulation of guidelines to support those reasons. State
judges need not agree with the constitutional analysis in Lagares, or support the inherent
authority of courts to subject prosecutorial discretion to an arbitrary and capricious standard of
review, to see how more rigorous judicial insistence on explanations for prosecutor behavior can
naturally lead to greater internal self-regulation.
220. See Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation, supra note 185, at 1006.
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